HABERMAS’ COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AND ITS PLATONIC, BIBLICAL AND METAPHYSICAL CONSOLIDATION
AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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PRELIMINARY REMARKS ABOUT EVERYTHING

In his great theory of the communicative action Jurgen Habermas presents reality as action and divides it into two parts: teleological action and communicative action; he is, in particular, concerned also about “reason” (about “rationality”) in its, as he thinks, Enlightenment meaning as single reason or distinguished reason. At the same time Enlightenment reason includes Hobbes and, especially, Lock’s notion of many reasons in the process of agreement. In any case, Habermas discusses the question of reason with modern philosophers, from Kant, Heidegger, Derrida, Castoriadis, to Foucault and Luhmann. We may say that he is concerned about reality formulated in two main categories: reason and action. Apart from Habermas, we are not very concerned about the importance of the notion of reason, nor about action. In our opinion, the more important thing is that reality (and its Habermas’ understanding included) is in principle

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2 As he probably thinks; anyway, he is fully included into Enlightenment paradigm.
3 Developed “enlightenment” notion of reason will be given below, however.
divided, and that the philosopher looks for the unity of the divided world. He finds unity, in Kantian tradition, in the standards of rational thinking or in scientific knowledge, taken by mediation of normative systems. The latter is close to the proposal presented below, although Habermas’ variant is rather sociocultural than strictly philosophical. Are those his only keys for unity?

We stress the question of division and unity because we think they are primary. At the same time the stress on division and unity requires reformulation of the Habermas problem a little, before we propose and explain its general philosophical foundations. For that we would like to draw attention to his other terms: communication and intention for agreement. We think, if we want to abide by the discourse in the paradigm of communication, it would be better to hold the wholeness of being not as reason or action, but precisely as communication, and to divide reality into another two parts, into two main kinds of communication (instead of two kinds of reason, instrumental reason and communicative reason, and of two kinds of action: teleological and communicative); two parts consequently: communication as domination and communication as agreement, as intention and seeking for agreement. The term “communication”, unlike “reason” or “action”, doesn’t need additional explanation about the mode of being – “communication” indicates immediately its proper structure and dynamics, whereas the former terms need complement: what kind of reason, what kind of action? Finally, communication will also need complement: what type of communication? It is, of course, just the first step of reformulation – it is description only, whereas we need a strictly philosophical, metaphysical formula, when we want to get and confirm validity. We know that Habermas is very concerned about validity- everybody is concerned about validity. At the same time we cannot be sure what Habermas thinks about the duality of the world. He proposes to change one paradigm, instrumental action, into another- communicative action; so, reformulation is needed, first of all, for the transition from description to explanation. It is the first; the second: differing from Habermas, we don’t

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4 Two kinds of communication fulfill the wholeness of being, whereas action (even of two kinds of) does not.
leave out the old paradigm, the paradigm of teleology and domination, we keep both in mind, transformed according to communicative paradigm. In any case, how to ground all these divisions (two reasons, two actions, two types of communication finally), how to ground the division itself (the certain kind of “dualism” instead of the popular, simple, totally unified, not in principle divided unity), how to ground the distinction of communicative action in the frame of reality, totally fulfilled (and apparently actualy fulfilled) with determinism and domination, totally fulfilled with instrumental reason, totally fulfilled with the absence of subjects. At the same time there are some conceptually possible situations connected to the presence or absence of the subject: absence more than one subject, the presence of one subject as a subject of teleological action (god as a subject of action, of creation, nature as a subject, or every higher level of hierarchy as a subject), many subjects as the subjects of teleological actions only, and two subjects at least as the subjects of communicative relationship; the subjects are actually always present, but not always in the proper subject role. The subjectless, the fashionable postmodern subjectless, has probably much in common with linguistics’ “language speaking human being”. The subjectless discourse (rather than philosophy) transists particularity of sociocultural being (socialisation etc.) The general statement about reality in a philosophical meaning, reality as “everything”, the statement performing whole reality as an “object”. Anyway– is the reality principally divided? Is it divided, on the fundamental level, into two parts only? Has everything got a structure, is everything relationship? Are the sides (parts) of relationship in principle different, is the reduction of one part of it to another in principle impossible? Is the transgression of this impossibility possible? By the way, this transgression and the question of its possibility or impossibility has special philosophical meanings. And, first of all, according to Habermas, is communicative action possible? Is communicative action more than an ethical claim? How to explain communicative action metaphysically? How is communicative action possible? Is communicative interaction necessary?

We will try to answer these questions in two ways: arguing “from authority” and arguing by metaphysical arguments. The first way is the way of Plato’s dilemma and the Biblical dual message about humanity,
worth and cultural orders. In this way we will examine the cultural (philosophical as well as literary) foundation of the thinking in the category of duality and, last but not least, in the category of unity of the dual world. Pay attention: Plato, as well as the Bible, is called here as the witness of dualism\(^5\), not of monism\(^6\), as it occurs in popular interpretation of both complex messages.

Let’s begin, however, with metaphysics, because the true beginning is in metaphysics only\(^7\) (metaphysics is also a key to the interpretation of Plato and the Bible). The best known beginnings are in the myth of creation (not just the Biblical one, certainly), and in Hegel’s “being and nothing”. Hegel is not of interest in this paper, though it doesn’t at all mean that he is not of interest in this context at all\(^8\).

**THE DIALECTICAL METAPHYSICS**

There is no room for the report from history of discussion around metaphysics and even from the Habermas’ approach to it. Habermas, as a sociologist first of all, is found rather in the countermetaphysics camp; he is concerned about detranscendentalisation of reason and about making it free of transcendence. In the certain, strictly philosophical sense of transcendence, it is rather impossible. The main function of reason is transcendent and this function is the subject of metaphysics. Just a remark: we treat metaphysics as a synonym of philosophy, as its core and principal part; metaphysical questions are the questions of the absolute beginning.

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\(^5\) There are many kinds of dualisms. The dualism presented bellow is dualism of two alternative (and coexisting) modes of being’s being, not (for example), the best known dualism of spirit and body, ideas and material world and so on.

\(^6\) Philosophically (metaphysically) examined foundations of being is the sphere of dualism-monism controversy, whereas pluralism belongs to the sphere of “positive” being, which is competency of science.

\(^7\) Nothing like “scientific” Big Bang can play role of the true beginning.

\(^8\) In the light of Hegel's philosophy a communicative action and seeking for agreement is particular and relative, whereas the action of Absolute Subject is... absolute. The action of Absolute Subject is necessary, the action (including communicative one) is valid, if it is well included into the frame of necessity.
of what exists certainly and how it exists, of element of being and of the 
source of the “energy” of being. And another “metaphilosophical” remark: 
metaphysics must not be “metaphysical”, metaphysics should be dialecti-
cal – that is the reason why ontology is not sufficient. The short report
from the metaphysical process, containing both the questions and answers,
looks as follows:

According to Cartesian tradition (also Socratic as well as, partly,
Augustinian), what exists in the beginning, exists absolutely and, suitably,
exists for sure, exists without doubt, is I (is Me). But, contrary to the so
called “philosophy of subject” (including its Cartesian variant), it is not
the full beginning, it is not only the absolute being; not just “Me” exists
without doubt. Descartes had an intuition about it, but his proposal is not
satisfying: “God”, with his claim for full absolute status, deprives Me of any
first-rate metaphysical meaning; nature, as an equivalent complement of
Me, also deprives it (deprives me) of a metaphysical status, turning it into
the subject of knowledge, into the epistemological subject. Meanwhile Me
needs something with which it might and must construct the elementary
relationship. What is the other side (part) of a relationship, what relation-
ship is in the beginning?

The source of my “knowledge” about Me as something absolutely exist-
ing is my own experience, which may be called “metaphysical”, because it
indicates something meeting metaphysical criteria, criteria of beginning,
of element, of dynamics. What is also given in the experience of this kind,
without any relative aspects? God, as we know, doesn’t meet this criterion,
because he (because it, god I mean) is done just as a notion, symbol and
image, as a product of imagination, as a cultural product, as something
suitably relative; nature is given by the limited number of phenomena, the

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9 If ontology is about what the world is like, metaphysics is about how it becomes, 
how it is created. It is obvious, that there are two types of metaphysics: religious (ideo-
logical) and philosophical. This distinction bereaves modern (and postmodern) horror
metaphicus of grounds.

10 For more detailed presentation of the dialectical metaphysics of choice see, e.g.,
W. Paradowska, R. Paradowski, Universal Pattern of Culture and the Dialectical Metaphys-
wholeness of nature is just an idea\textsuperscript{11}. What is the proper notion of all of that, giving with Me the fullness of being, the wholeness of reality, of everything existing in the meaning as above? The only “something”, meeting those criteria, something given in metaphysical experience of separation and distinctness from Me (from what I am separated and distinct) is Not-Me. Me and Not-Me\textsuperscript{12} in experiencing separation and distinctness. Me, not reducible to anything, what is not Me, Not-Me, not reducible to any features or peculiarity of Me. Important remark: the only “feature” of Me is that I am not anything else, the only feature of Not-Me is that it is not Me. Me and Not-Me are lacking in any “positive”, substantial attributes\textsuperscript{13}. Me exists in distinctness and separation, as well as Not-Me. And, of course, in mutual connection, in a relationship.

Something in the absolute beginning is double; the element, an irreducible part (Me and Not-Me relationship of separation and distinctness) is obviously double. There is nothing single in the beginning\textsuperscript{14}, there is nothing single at all. Being is irreducibly structured. We may say that the number two is the absolute number of reality, of the “higher” reality at

\textsuperscript{11} Regulative, in Kantian version, constitutive, in Habermas’, but even in the latter it isn’t complement of Me – nature is already certain, whereas Me and its complement should meet the criterion of uncertainty/indefiniteness.

\textsuperscript{12} Me and Not-Me is the equivalent of John’s Word, equivalent of Logos. See Jn 1, 1. Single Word needs something else (“God” for example, to do something together: “Through him God made all things”); double Word (Me and Not-Me) needs neither “God” nor anything like this for creating reality.

\textsuperscript{13} Me and Not-Me distinct and separated from each other could be treated as appearing from something, but this hypothetical “something” is not the object of any, the more so metaphysical, experience, so it is purely nothing.

\textsuperscript{14} The Bible, used as an authority by religions, doesn’t show “God” as a single, independent being, as something “absolute” (like in theological discourse), but it shows it always in relationship. Look at the beginning of the text, where God acts as a part of the relationship of creation. John begins with the single Word (his Word is single, otherwise unlike ours), but he quickly pass to relationship of God and Word. The position of Word is not clear: as the object part in the instrumental relationship first (“Through him God made all things”), and as autonomous next (“the Word was God”, “the Word was the source of life”; the both are obvious – if the Word itself is devided).
least, which is the subject of metaphysics. The number two is the number of relationship, the element of being\textsuperscript{15}.

Separation and distinctness, metaphysical experience of separation and distinctness, needs to be put in order (arranged reality is the sufficient proof for that need), and the act of arranging and constructing of being as ordered being begins in the frame of metaphysical experience: Me and Not-Me are forced to arrange the process of separation and becoming distinct and they do it. They make a metaphysical choice, which is the key and instrument for this arrangement (arrangement the chaos of metaphysical experience, which includes the declining of separation and distinctness) and for constructive work, for creation of the “higher” being. They define the relationship, defined up to now just as relationship of separation etc., of duality of Me and Not-Me. The choice supports and consolidates the duality, because only two fundamental orders are possible, two fundamental types of relationship are possible. Two principal orders are possible as the result of metaphysical choice, made by two sides of the fundamental relationship, Me and Not-Me in relationship, together. Metaphysical choice gives two solutions, both equally possible and necessary. The first: Me forces its authority on Not-Me, and Not-Me accepts it (permission as the elementary form of agreement is necessary for establishing the relationship), or Not-Me forces its authority on Me, and I agree to it. One subject of the relationship demands to be treated as a subject yielding domination over the another, treating him as the object of domination; they establish the subject – object structure of being, subject and object of domination in particular. The second solution: I treat Not-Me as a subject, demanding equal treatment for myself\textsuperscript{16}; when the choice is mutual (when the demand

\textsuperscript{15} Not exactly like at Pythagoras’ philosophy of numbers, where “two” is extracted from “one”; here in reverse: “two” (Me and Not-Me) is in the beginning, “one” (subject-subject or subject-object attitude and relationship, irreducibly double, anyway) is the result of choice and a choice itself. Just a remark: only choice itself gives unity of the whole being, whereas the certain choice gives the unity of certain order only. Only the choice itself is the real “one”, in spite of being choice from two.

\textsuperscript{16} It gives a philosophical foundation for the human rights concept, as well as for the democratic political philosophy in general, in spite of two different ways of understanding of the human rights: as the form of democratic values (of the law in proper meaning) or as the compensation and softening of the authoritarian political order.
is accepted), both subjects construct the subject-subject structure of being. Sociologists often require proof that the second solution is more than an idea or utopia. From the sociological point of view the statistics (how many subjects choose the second, subject-subject type of relationship) is important to define the certain sociocultural order, which may be distinguished from one based on domination. From the philosophical point of view, to ascertain just one such relationship, subject-subject relationship, founded on the base of the subject-subject metaphysical choice, is sufficient. It is not difficult to find even more\footnote{Many enough for establishing the certain type of cultural order (we may name it “democratic”, or “liberaldemocratic”), among three other typical cultural orders: “archaic”, founded on magic as the dominant cultural institution, “traditional”, founded on religion as the institution principally different from magic, despite of the mixture of both in the empirical religious cultural reality, and “consumer” culture, founded on advertising. The dominating institution of “democratic” culture is law in the narrow, proper meaning, as the form of agreement (alliance etc.). See more in W. Paradowska, R. Paradowski, \textit{Typology of cultures and economy in culture}, “Hemispheres. Studies on Cultures and Societies” (Quarterly review, Polish Academy of Sciences), 18/2003. Remark: principal difference between magic and religion is rooted in the difference between the status of human being in relationship with a higher power, imagined first and real next (or reversely). In religion, in particular, that status is described by the term “nothing”.

\footnote{To be precise, the alternative solution is refused just as the leading principle, but not in general – it is always accepted as the additional principle. See, for exemple, the role of “love of neighbour” in the Christian ethical system with its principal rule of obedience, or the status of hierarchy and authority as an additional, limited, functional rule in the frame of the principal equality of democratic political and cultural order. See also: W. Paradowska, R. Paradowski, \textit{W sprawie “dekalogu” etyki politycznej liberalnej demokracji} (About “decalogue” of the political ethics of liberal democracy), “Środkowo-europejskie Studia Polityczne” [Central European Political Studies, Adam Mickiewicz University Quarterly review], 2006, No 6.}}. In any case, reality is divided into subject-object and subject-subject relationships. If the choice is real, if subject-subject relationship is possible as well as subject-object (domination, power and so on), the choice itself is the clasp, unifying divided reality. There is always choice, relationships are chosen, one is accepted, another – refused\footnote{To be precise, the alternative solution is refused just as the leading principle, but not in general – it is always accepted as the additional principle. See, for exemple, the role of “love of neighbour” in the Christian ethical system with its principal rule of obedience, or the status of hierarchy and authority as an additional, limited, functional rule in the frame of the principal equality of democratic political and cultural order. See also: W. Paradowska, R. Paradowski, \textit{W sprawie “dekalogu” etyki politycznej liberalnej demokracji} (About “decalogue” of the political ethics of liberal democracy), “Środkowo-europejskie Studia Polityczne” [Central European Political Studies, Adam Mickiewicz University Quarterly review], 2006, No 6.}; the choice is absolute “being” then, connecting (and separating) relative parts of it. Choice is actually transcendence, because it is not determined by the dominating sociocultural order, although it
is always under the strong pressure of it. If the choice is as above, the subject-subject relationship is not just a part of being (communication in Habermas’ terminology), it is also the general structure of reality- I am the subject of choice in subject-subject relationship first of all, but in subject-object relationship also: in subject-object relationship the “object” has also a choice: it may, risking life (risking not being separated and different), to stop supporting the subject-object relationship. It may choose to require to be treated as subject. The subject-subject relationship, the communicative relationship, is doubly real, not just singly, like the instrumental reason of pessimist philosophers and ideologists of domination.

Now, one more remark about the notion of “subject”. In the sociological, “objective” meaning, a subject is part of subject-subject relationship. Defined in a philosophical way a subject is the subject of subject-subject metaphysical choice. And, finally, a subject is not anything which “is”, like a stone or flower. A subject “is” (subject exists) in choice only; I transform Me into subject when I am choosing. When I am choosing I transform Me into a human being19.

It is important to stress that fundamental choice of this kind is not a choice from an uncertain number of possibilities (like a choice among commodities in consumer culture or like different ways to certain telos of teleological action), but a strictly limited choice between a subject-subject and a subject-object approach to Me and Not-Me simultaneously.

The metaphysical deduction may not be convincing, at least at first, especially if it is not signed suitably. Therefore, let’s try to see how the dialectical metaphysics of choice works on the Platonic and Biblical material.

**PLATO’S DILEMMA**

Plato gives an unquestionably philosophical proposal of the fundamental “twofoldity” of being, while the philosophical status of the Bible (of the first three chapters of the Book of Genesis in particular), and double image of the world, contained there, only needs proof. The Bible is widely

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19 A choice is at the same time necessary: outing off a choice is a choice also.
regarded as something originally “religious”. Only “twofoldity” permitted in the religious interpretation of the Book, is duality of good, understood as god understands it, and evil, also as god defines it.\textsuperscript{20}

The popular interpretation of Plato’s philosophy is concerned with the theory of ideas, about the ideas and their shades – the material world, and about the idea of Good as the principal one. This concept of Good was easily connected to the mythical concept of god, resulting with the religious system of Christianity, coming through mediation by Neoplatonic philosophy. In the same time there is some other possibility to explain Platonic design, taking the great dilemma, formulated in the dialogue \textit{Euthyphro} by Socrates, asking there pointedly “What is loved of gods is holy or what is holy is loved of gods?”\textsuperscript{21} Coming out from the narrow frames of religious terminology, remembering also the rank of the idea of Good in Plato’s system and understanding that Good is only something which can be over anyone (if anything can be over any god) we may ask rather about god and good (god and worth in the more modern philosophical language): is something worthy because gods like it or the gods like it because it is worthy? Are gods over Good or is the good over the gods? Is god the sole instructor of the notion of Good (should god to be the only instructor), or should nobody be the sole instructor of the notion of Good? We may say that we have here two communicative situations. The first one means that there is The Subject, Absolute Subject, Absolute Sender, communicating his notion of Good to an addressee of this announcement. The second: the question first. If the definition of Good is not the opinion of the privileged subject about Good, what is Good being “over god”, how is Good itself, being in so privileged a position, Good placed higher than god? Who and how defines Good, not dependent of any separated, independent subject, aspiring to define Good arbitrarily? God as the subject of teleological action, of Creation and Domination over human

\textsuperscript{20} Even the Polish 1997 Constitution doesn’t assert, that God is the only source (only treated as source, strictly speaking) of the fundamental worth (and good among them), and notices, that there are people who consider otherwise, though doesn’t explain, what is the source of that nonauthoritarian understanding. \textit{See Preamble.}

beings and the world? In any case, the first communicative action (teleological action in Habermas’ version) means that god\textsuperscript{22} arbitrarily defines Good; the second communicative action (also in Habermas’ meaning) means that Good is not defined arbitrarily. All of that means even more: Plato’s dilemma is the construction of being. More precisely: Defining (two ways of) is the synonym of reality. The reality is divided into the “God”, defining Good, and Good, defined otherwise. The Platonic answer for the question “how” is obvious: in dialogue. Is the dialogue also a key to the unity of the divided world? In this case it plays a double role – the first one is particular: the mechanism of the searching for the definition of Good\textsuperscript{23}, located over every separated subject; the second is “universal”: dialogue, or communicative action, communicative relationship actually, is the universal structure of reality\textsuperscript{24}. Not hierarchy and power, not arbitrary will, like in Foucault’s concept for example, but dialogue or communicative

\textsuperscript{22} We are not interested in a definition of God in any theological respect but just in a definition of “God” as a symbol or metaphor (of “arbitrariness”, power, hierarchy etc., or, in the special Biblical case, as an “image of God”, of nonhierarchical relationship also).

\textsuperscript{23} The general idea of Good should be transformed into the Good defined. There is just one idea of Good and two main Goods defined, the Good defined arbitrarily and the Good defined in dialogue. Plato’s kind of dilemma, “Dostoevsky’s dilemma”, should be regarded to evil: is a murder bad because gods don’t like it, or gods don’t like murder because it is bad. Dostoevski is known by “if God doesn’t exist, everything is permitted”. It is not sure that it is his position indeed. Anyway, what is the reason of not kill, if the arbitrary will is not decisive, the more so that God is just a symbol of arbitrary power (of the power of a higher level of hierarchy over a lower one)? The more so also that (in religious context, and, in general, in the context of ideology of authoritarian and hierarchical order) “do not kill” means “do not kill whom I forbid to kill, kill who I order to kill”. G.E. Moore, for example, was very concerned about definition of good and was very disappointed that it is impossible to define it. He found a solution in intuition (G.E. Moore, \textit{Principia Ethica}, Cambridge 1962). Another solution is done above: the idea of good is, of course, undefinable (it doesn’t require any definition), but there are no problem with the definition of good itself, if we rememeber about two different, metaphysically rooted, modes of the process of definition. Moore (and not just him) didn’t see those mediation by a mode, indicated by Plato long, long ago.

\textsuperscript{24} In spite of the fact that communicative action is not the full philosophical equivalent of metaphysical choice with its (communicative action’s) stress on subject and its choice of one from two possible principal types of action (subject-subject “action” instead of subject-object one).
action exactly. It is not everything about the unity of the divided world (and not everything about the general formula of it). The empirical world, real sociocultural order should follow Good or God as primary. Dilemma should be solved. The solution, the universal key to the unity, was presented above: it is choice, it is freedom defined as choice between subject-object and subject-subject relationship. Coming back now to Plato himself: yes, theory of the ideas, of course, but taken through the dilemma. Dilemma gives dynamics to the higher world, besides elementary structure which it also gives.

**BIBLE AS A BOOK OF CULTURE**

And what about the Bible, about Genesis in particular? Let us place the general notion at the beginning. For people free of religious illusions, it is rather obvious that the Bible is not a “religious” book first of all, that the Bible is written, of course, under the inspiration of the “holy spirit”, but the “holy spirit” of artistic inspiration, as well as “holy spirit” of the political order. The Bible is a kind of a constitution. Anyway, the Bible is literature in the common sense of the word. Its religious and, what is the same, political function is second. We underline this especially – in our country it is not the normal view for this question.

The second principal observation is that the Bible is an *opus* with ingenious structure: myths, some kinds of poetry, including erotic, law regulations, songs, prophesies and so on. And a philosophical construction among the Bible’s attributes. The first three chapters of the Book of Genesis have a philosophical construction.

The first three chapters of the book of Genesis don’t function in culture as a philosophical message, but as a specific religious message- as a simple, single, uniform message about Lord God, creating the world and man, and punishing people for disobedience. At the same time the message is not single, the message is double. The story of genesis contains two different messages about the human being, two messages about good and god, and presents two principally different kinds of communication relationship- communication as domination, and communication as
agreement. For this purpose the story of genesis is built of two different, separated stories.

We are not going to extract every philosophical aspect of the story about creation of the world, for example the similarity to the scientific description of the evolution of the world in the first story of creation and the different description in another (that one beloved by the “creationists”), and to display the possible consequences of not one, but two elements in the beginning: “god” and “earth and heaven”. The more so, that we are interested nowadays just in this coincidence: the structure of reality presented in Genesis, is not like in typical religious discourse, speaking about God, who created the world “in six days”, made man of the dust, forbidding him to eat certain fruits, and made for him, for his pleasure, a helpful woman from a certain bone. The structure of reality there is rather like in Plato’s dilemma, and even more: like in Habermas’ theory of communicative action. There is a difference also: the Book of Genesis (and indeed, the whole Bible) stresses even more definitely than Plato does the key of unity of the divided world. More definitely indicates what is universal.

Look at the text: God creates human beings twice: as man and woman at the same time, in the first story\textsuperscript{25}, and as a man only, in the second\textsuperscript{26}. In the second story God creates the animals next, and at last a woman, stressing their (of woman as well as of animals) secondary rank\textsuperscript{27}. There is no hierarchy in the first story, there is no interdiction to define good and evil independently. But there is something more important: the notion of “image of god” is connected to man and woman not being in hierarchy\textsuperscript{28}, not to man dominating over woman and animals, as it is in the second story. It is meaningful – the first story is about nonhierarchical relationship, only the second is about hierarchical one, about domination and obedience. Only the second story has been adopted by religion as a principal message\textsuperscript{29}.

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\textsuperscript{25} Gen 1, 27.
\textsuperscript{26} Gen 2, 7.
\textsuperscript{27} Gen 2, 18.
\textsuperscript{28} Gen 1, 27.
\textsuperscript{29} The message of the first story (nonhierarchical relationship between human beings) is adopted as la imited, secondary message (“The second most important com-
Both stories have the continuation in the myth about displacement of the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil. In the story about hierarchy and domination the fruit belongs to God\textsuperscript{30}, the highest one in the hierarchy – only the Lord God defines good and evil there. The story about displacement begins with woman, using reason: we are witness of the inner dialogue in her mind\textsuperscript{31}. In the religious interpretation it is disobedience simply, and the third chapter of the Book of Genesis is even entitled “Human Disobedience”. It is disobedience, of course, but just from a hierarchical, authoritarian pattern point of view. From the wider point of view it is looking for agreement, looking for exchange of arguments. The fruit, displaced from the Lord’s control to woman first and to man’s hands next, is a symbol of this new communicative action and communicative relationship: the “fruit” of knowledge of good and evil could (and should) be divided first and should be common afterwards. “God” is “angry” at such disobedience at first, and establishes the new pattern next, admitting that human ability to define good and evil is equal to his own, (“Now the man has become like one of us and has knowledge of what is good and what is bad”\textsuperscript{32}, God says). The covenant, the alliance will be, from this moment, the privileged “god’s” pattern of relationship. Exactly like Habermas’ communicative action and communicative relationship exactly\textsuperscript{33}.

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\textsuperscript{30} Gen 2, 17. Exclusive right to define good is obviously exclusive right to fix the goal, the common goal at least. In this context good and goal is the same; In both contexts good and goal is the same; just the contexts are different – the manner of defining of good, we mean.

\textsuperscript{31} Gen 3, 1–5.

\textsuperscript{32} Gen 3, 22.

\textsuperscript{33} We can say consequently, that reality is double and is a compound of two kinds of communicative relationships, and every kind of communicative relationship is double; nevertheless if the “duality” of the communicative relationship grounded on subject-subject metaphysical choice is adequately structured (communicative relationship is a compound of communicative action I and communicative action II, both directed for agreement), the communicative relationship grounded on subject-object metaphysical choice is complementary (inadequately) structured (the communicative relationship is
THE STRUCTURE OF BEING
AND TWO DIFFERENT REASONS

There are two principal relationships in the Bible: domination/obedience, and alliance. The latter is at the same time particular and universal: the alliance, the nonauthoritarian relationship, seeking for agreement, has “divine” status in the Book. There is also something about beloved Habermas’ category of reason there. The first, reason of authoritarian God, defining good and dominating over man, and man’s reason of understanding interdiction and the necessity of obedience34, and the second: reasons of subjects, mutually admitting competency of each other to define good and searching for agreement, including a critical approach to the authoritarian claims of hierarchical reason35. In light of the dominating patriarchal culture it is rather ironic, that, according to the Bible, the new communicative reason, the reason of searching for agreement, as well as full size metaphysical choice36, is introduced to human culture by woman, who is, in religious tradition, an incarnation of irrationality, and of the reason of obedience, and, generally, of the lower rank of humanity.

It is the source of the support for Habermas’ concept of being as communication and for the possibility and necessity of non instrumental communication thereby: Plato, who passes, in popular understanding, for a protagonist of totalitarian order; Plato, who now appears to be a nonauthoritarian philosopher, and symbolic “first woman”, which has initiated the transition from an animal existence of natural determination and “God’s” absolute domination, to the human life of choice and freedom, to the disposition for communication, agreement and social contract. And,

a compound there of two teleological actions, both directed instrumentally, one for domination, another for surviving).

34 And, of course, man’s reason, dominating over woman, and her reason of understanding of the necessity of obedience.

35 Hierarchical reason in its classical description: Paul’s “man is the head of a woman, Christ is the head of a man”, etc. Every “reason” is, anyway, reason-reason relationship, hierarchical as well as “communicative”.

36 Introductory form of metaphysical choice presents man accepting silently the Lord God’s prohibition.
last but not least, the dialectical metaphysics of choice, and its explanation of the structure of being as communication.

Someone may say that Habermas doesn’t need any help from our side to understand himself better. That’s right, probably. But there are us who need help to conceive Habermas better, may be even better than he comprehends himself.

Antoine de Saint-Exupery wrote once that the meaning of things lies not in things themselves, but in our attitudes to them. What those attitudes are like and how they work we tried to present above through metaphysical, Platonic and Biblical material, introducing a new glance at the old philosophical and political questions.

**SUMMARY**

In this paper we would like to present a certain philosophical concept, which may be related to some contemporary philosophical controversies (and to political philosophy’ controversies included) concentrated around such problems as, the meaning of metaphysics and as the understanding of freedom. We are going also to say a word about the particularity of the philosophical understanding of reality, including the status of intention for agreement. The concept we present further for additional foundation of the Habermas’ idea of communicative action is a compound of metaphysics itself, and of our own concept of metaphysics, and of the two particular questions – interpretation of Plato’s philosophy as well as interpretation of the Biblical message about anthropogenesis.

**Keywords:** communicative action, Habermas, Plato’s dilemma, Biblic pattern of antropogenesis, democratic political philosophy, dialectical metaphysics of choice