Questions of citizenship and nationhood have increasingly gained prominence given the internationalisation of employment, especially with respect to the free movement of workers within the EU. Scholar Rogers Brubaker has suggested that an absence of a strong identity as a nation-state and the lack of an established national citizenship have contributed to “the confused and bitter politics of immigration and citizenship during the last quarter-century” in Britain\(^1\). This legacy continues to this day. For instance, on the first of January 2014, migration and employment restrictions on Romanians and Bulgarians were lifted, provoking mass public outcry in the UK. In a recent poll, three quarters of respondents expressed concern about the possible influx of Romanians and Bulgarian migrants\(^2\). Playing on populist fears, London mayor Boris Johnson quipped: “We

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can do nothing to stop the entire population of Transylvania – charming though most of them may be – from trying to pitch camp at Marble Arch”. British ministers have even considered launching a negative publicity campaign in Bulgaria and Romania to dissuade migrants, highlighting the dreary weather and lack of job opportunities in Britain.

This public backlash stems in part from the governmental mishandling of the events of 2004, in which the British government granted the EU8 countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta) unrestricted and immediate access to the UK’s labour market. The British government predicted only between 5000 and 13 000 migrants a year, based on figures from a study by Dustman et al. Despite how the authors of the study warned that the figures would need to be interpreted cautiously given methodological inconsistencies – ministers justified the decision to allow EU8 citizens immediate and unfettered access to the UK labour markets with support from this figure. In fact, the actual level of immigration post-2004 accession proved to be more than 20 times the estimate. This debate has provoked wariness towards the use of evidence to justify policy decisions among ministers.

Since 2004, the UK has enjoyed a decade of experience in managing migration from EU8 countries. This time around, how well founded are the fears that 2014 will see another ‘flood’ of migrants, on par with levels experienced in 2004? This essay argues that EU2 migration, from Romania and Bulgaria, will not be a repeat of 2004. To begin, this essay will examine the reasons why there was a twenty-fold discrepancy between official estimates of expected migrants after the 2004 enlargement. Then, by using Poland as a case study of typical migration flows following the 2004 migration period, this essay will show that — contrary to predictions based on standard migration theory — mass migration outflows in 2004

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4 A. Glennie, J. Pennington, op.cit., p. 2.
6 A. Glennie, J. Pennington, op.cit., p. 2.
is not a good predictor of events to come in 2014. Among other factors, considering that those who wanted to migrate to the UK from Romania and Bulgaria already have migrated pre-2007 accession and more countries opened their labour markets in 2014 than they did in 2004, the UK so far has not yet seen and is not likely to see a mass influx of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants as it did with those of Polish origin in 2004. However, like Polish migration, Romanian and Bulgarian migration will tend to be more circular and ‘fluid’.

METHODOLOGY

The statistics compiled in this paper rely on sources such as the International Passenger Survey, the Labour Force Survey, and the Worker Registration Scheme. The Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) was introduced in May 2004 to regulate access to the labour market of migrants from the EU8 countries. WRS data can be problematic because it routinely underestimates labour migration from EU8 countries given that all migrants register with the scheme. There is a registration fee which acts as a disincentive to register. Moreover, the self-employed are not required to register (ibid.). There is no requirement to de-register so the data does not lend itself to identifying the actual length of stay or the number of EU8 migrants working in the UK at any point in time (ibid.). The EU2 migrants from Romania and Bulgaria are not covered in the WRS.

The most recent 2014 figures used from the Office for National Statistics rely on the International Passenger Survey (IPS), a large sample survey that is carried out at airports, seaports, and tunnel routes throughout the UK. The IPS estimates identify between 4 000 and 5 000 long-term migrants each year from a sample of between 700 000 and 800 000 passengers. Though the IPS does not include adjustments for asylum seekers or those who change their migration intentions, the IPS is methodologically sound.

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given its random sampling analysis, the two-stage sampling process, and
the weighting of respondents in correspondence with the amount of pas-
senger traffic known to have passed through that port or route to eliminate
the skewing of data to certain nationalities or residents of certain coun-
tries. The IPS also includes information from a diverse range of sources
such as the Civil Aviation Authority, Department for Transport, Eurostar,
Eurotunnel, British Airports Authority, and many airports. However,
one must note that the IPS confidence interval does not take account of
non-sampling errors such as non-response bias and measurement error.
Due to inadequate sampling design and coverage of the IPS, a significant
amount of long-term migration, especially of EU8 citizens, was missed
between 2004 and 2008, prior to methodological improvements made to
the IPS in 2009. Moreover, the IPS does not include migration over the
land border between Northern Ireland and Ireland. Another weakness
is that sampling errors are too large to measure the number of migrants
to a single region within the UK, from a single region within the UK, or
from a single country of origin.

There are also issues with the IPS given that some interviewees are
unable or unwilling to provide accurate information. For instance,
a migrant stating an intention to reside in one city may stay there for only
a short period of time before moving to another part of the UK. As such,
the Labour Force Survey (LFS) should be used in conjunction with the
IPS data given that the LFS is based on where migrants actually live rather
than their initial intentions. The LFS is a representative cross-sectional
survey used to examine the labour market outcomes of immigrants in
the UK. Given that the LFS only samples a relatively small proportion

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8 Office for National Statistics, Quality and Methodology Information, “Long-Term
9 A. Cangiano, op.cit., p. 5.
10 Ibidem.
11 Office for National Statistics, Quality and Methodology Information, “Long-Term
12 S. Drinkwater, J. Eade, M. Garapich, Poles Apart? EU Enlargement and the Labour
Market Outcomes of Immigrants in the United Kingdom, “International Migratio” 2009,
of the population, it follows that there is only a fairly low number of recent EU8 migrants in the data, despite the large influx identified in the Worker Registration Scheme\textsuperscript{13}. Recent migrants in the United Kingdom are less likely to be included in the survey in comparison to natives or longer-term migrants\textsuperscript{14}. For instance, people who have moved to the UK in the six months before the survey are not included because the definition of ‘usually resident’ requires at least six months of stay in the country. Moreover, recent migrants are more likely to refuse to answer the survey or provide incomplete information because of language barriers or mistrust, especially if their residence or work status is not entirely compliant with immigration regulations. The LFS is likely to underestimate the amount of EU8 migrants in the UK, especially those who have been in the country for less than six months and those living in communal establishments because it is difficult to include such individuals in the sampling frame\textsuperscript{15}. As with much migration research, methodology for collecting the data means that migrants in irregular housing situations such as tied accommodation, multiple-occupancy, and informal accommodation are undercounted. Undercounting is especially significant in the case of EU2 migrants staying in irregular housing arrangements\textsuperscript{16}.

Furthermore, because citizens of other EU member states only compose a small fragment of the population in most member states, information on mobile workers is not included in regular EU surveys, such as the Labour Force Survey or EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions\textsuperscript{17}. Large groups of migrants are unrepresented or underrepresented in the available migration statistics because they are not obliged to register if they work and live for short periods of time in the host country\textsuperscript{18}. Data on migration

\textsuperscript{13} Ibidem, p. 168.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{15} A. Cangiano, op.cit., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{16} C. Nygaard, A. Pasierbék, E. Francis-Brophy, *Bulgarian and Romanian migration to the South East and the UK: profile of A2 migrants and their distribution*, “University of Reading: South East Strategic Partnership for Migration” Nov 2013, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{18} G. Engbersen, *Migration Transitions in an Era of Liquid Migration*, [in:] European
from Bulgaria and Romania largely measures permanent moves rather than shorter period of migration, which characterizes much current migration within the EU. More efforts should be undertaken to include mobile workers such as temporary or seasonal workers, posted and self-employed workers, and workers who commute from one country to another. For more accurate statistics, it is imperative to reunite administrative registers in member states to glean more information on the earnings and length of stay of mobile workers. Overall, there should be a more systematic attempt to consolidate different data sources on migrants entering the UK by incorporating data from visa applications processed at UK embassies, border statistics, employer applications, and settlement applications.

THE 2004 ACCESSION: THE BIGGEST DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN EUROPE SINCE WWII

To begin, the 2004 accession of Eastern European member states is often deemed the “biggest demographic change in Europe” since the Second World War. The eight new accession countries added 76 million workers to the European workforce alone — an increase of 16%. It has also been argued that the 2004 enlargement led to the largest ever wave of immigration to the UK. When the UK opened up its labour market to EU8 countries in 2004, it was one of a very few large European countries to

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22 Ibidem, p. 125.

do so. The result was a large and unforeseen influx of EU8 nationals moving to the UK\textsuperscript{24}. The UK government had only expected 20,000 economic migrant workers from Central and Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{25}. However, between 2011 and 2012, close to a million people born in EU8 countries settled in the UK\textsuperscript{26}. 70\% of the immigrants from the EU8 have been absorbed by the UK and Ireland alone in 2003\textsuperscript{27}. In part as a reaction to prior miscalculations following the 2004 enlargement, the UK maintained restrictions on Bulgaria and Romania for the maximum period allowed\textsuperscript{28}.

However, it may be unwarranted to assume that maintaining employment restrictions on Bulgaria and Romania for the maximum time period allowed is justified based on the prior underestimation of EU8 migrants following the 2004 enlargement. First of all, the 2004 case was unique because the original study which under-estimated the influx of EU8 migrants to the UK erroneously assumed that all 15 member states of the EU would open their labour markets at the same time. However, there were labour market restrictions imposed by four-fifths of EU members\textsuperscript{29}. In the end, only the UK, Ireland, and Sweden chose to open their markets, generating substantial diversion effects\textsuperscript{30}. Even when one disregards the widespread labour market restrictions, the predictions misjudged the ‘diversion effect’ created by other EU member states’ labour market restrictions\textsuperscript{31}. Predictions were skewed given that they were based on permanent, rather than temporary migration flows and a high number of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} T. Fic, \textit{Commentary: Migration from Bulgaria and Romania to the UK}, “National Institute Economic Review” May 2013, No. 244, p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{25} S. Pemberton, C. Stevens, \textit{The Recruitment and Retention of Central and Eastern European Migrant Workers in the United Kingdom: A Panacea or a Problem under the New Policies of Managed Migration}, “Regional Studies” Nov 2010, Vol. 44.9, p. 1290.
\item \textsuperscript{26} C. Nygaard, A. Pasierbek, E. Francis-Brophy, op.cit.
\item \textsuperscript{28} T. Fic, op.cit., p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{29} N. Pollard, M. Latorre, D. Sriskandarajah, \textit{Floodgates or Turnstiles? Post-EU Enlargement Migration Flows to (and from) the UK}, IPPR, April 2008, p. 16.
\item \textsuperscript{30} S. Pemberton, C. Stevens, op.cit., p. 1290.
\item \textsuperscript{31} N. Pollard, M. Latorre, D. Sriskandarajah, op.cit., p. 16.
\end{itemize}
EU8 nationals come to the UK for a short period of time before returning to Eastern Europe32. Furthermore, the predictions for the post-2004 accession migration figures were inconsistent. Due to a lack of historical data on migration from EU8 countries to the UK, the predictions were based on a model whose parameters were adapted using data from other countries such as Spain and Portugal33.

Lastly, the study failed to consider that around 30-40% of EU8 workers who registered following the 2004 accession were already working in the UK prior to enlargement34. Some of these workers were working legally or were residents as students but many were in the country as irregular workers35. As such, the 2004 enlargement is likely to have legalized previously illegal immigrants who were already in the UK, which would have created a purely statistical semblance of an ‘influx’ of EU8 workers in the post-accession period36.

POLISH MIGRATION TO THE UK AS CASE ILLUSTRATION OF TYPICAL POST-2004 MIGRATION FLOWS

Polish migration to the UK is an excellent exemplar of typical post-2004 migration flows because in the 2004 post-enlargement period, the UK was the most significant host country in the EU15 and Poland was the main source country37. In Nov 2006, the New York Times reported that 800 000 Polish nationals left the country since Poland joined the EU38. It is

32 Ibidem.
35 Ibidem, p. 16
36 M. Kahanec, A. Zaiceva, K. Zimmerman, op.cit., p. 10.
argued that Poles constitute the largest immigrant group among the EU8 immigrants since the EU enlargement, 63% of all immigrants and 71% of EU8 immigrants are from Poland. Since 2006, the UK has been the most popular destination country for Polish migrants. In the 2011 census, Polish was named the second most common language in the UK. In the UK, the economy remained buoyant throughout 2004-2007, with a low unemployment rate of 4.7%. A thriving economy, low unemployment, and high labour demand generated a robust pull factor to the UK. At the time of accession, the unemployment rate in Poland in 2003 was almost 20% while unemployment in the UK was less than 5%. Counterfactuals predict that migration to the UK would have been 155,000 without EU enlargement, whereas 610,000 migrants from EU8 countries resided in the UK by the end of 2008.

**PREDICTIONS BASED ON STANDARD MIGRATION THEORY**

Migration theory takes into account a wide range of factors — from changes in earnings and income levels, costs of living, unemployment rates, the quality of public goods, and the generosity of the welfare systems. Other factors such as age or skill would affect the migrant’s ability to adjust to the host society and draw maximum benefits from migration. According to standard migration theory, individuals migrate in order to maximize their gains by seeking higher wages in another country or

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40 A. White, op.cit., p. 27; S. Drinkwater, J. Eade, M. Garapich, op.cit., p. 162.
41 A. White, op.cit., p. 27.
43 A. White, op.cit., p. 17.
46 M. Kahanec, A. Zaiceva, K. Zimmerman, op.cit., p. 6.
The movement of workers from the east to the west is primarily motivated by employment opportunities and significant differences in earning potentials among the different regions. Upon inquiry, job-related factors such as salary dissatisfaction, job insecurity, and poor working conditions were found to be the most important mobility motives among migrants. Research suggests that decisions of EU8 and EU2 migrants are influenced by perceptions of the health of economies in migrants’ countries of origin and that they have an increasingly negative view of the economic situation in countries of origin. Indeed, EU migrants often cite enhanced earning potential as the primary reason for moving. Given that the highest intra-EU migration flows are from countries with relatively low GDP per capita to those with higher income levels and more employment opportunities, one could surmise that increasing earning potential is a key motivator in intra-European migration. With respect to the 2004 enlargement, the income gap between the new and old member states was larger than in previous accession rounds—a discrepancy which has triggered substantial migration flows. Measured in purchasing power parities, the GDP per capita in the EU8 in 2007 was 55% of that in the EU15. At current exchange rates, the GDP per capita in the EU8 was only one-third of the EU15, and hourly labour costs were about 24%. Nations with the lowest GDP per capita have the highest per capita annual migration flows prior to as well as following a crisis.

With respect to the EU2 countries, more than 40% of those in Bulgaria and Romania live at risk of falling below the poverty line and minimum

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49 M. Kahanec, A. Zaiceva, K. Zimmerman, op.cit., p. 22.
51 A. Dennett, op.cit., p. 99.
52 M. Barslund, M. Busse, op.cit., p. 118.
54 M. Barslund, M. Busse, op.cit., p. 118.
wages stand at a meagre $1.22 and $1.46 respectively\textsuperscript{55}. Intra-EU migration flows are highly responsive when potential gains are large\textsuperscript{56}. In 2002, the average origin/destination ratio for GDP-PPS (GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards) between regions in Poland and regions in the UK was 0.41, close to the threshold for the decile of highest migration flows. Upon examining the data for Romania and Bulgaria, inequalities in GDP-PPS between the UK are even larger. The average GDP-PPS ratio between the UK and EU2 countries is 0.29\textsuperscript{57}. Hence, according to the standard wage-differential and return on human capital models of international migration, it would be reasonable to predict a net outflow from Bulgaria and Romania to Western Europe\textsuperscript{58}. Taking into account standard migration theory coupled with past experiences of an influx of migrants following the 2004 enlargement, one would expect to see a similar wave of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants to the UK.

**MASS INFLUX OF ROMANIAN AND BULGARIAN MIGRANTS? RECENT STATISTICS SAY OTHERWISE**

Research by the Department for Communities and Local Government on the potential impact of EU2 migration on demand for services found evidence of EU2 accession migration since 2007 too scarce and used data from EU8 migration\textsuperscript{59}. However, assuming that Romanian and Bulgarian migration to the UK will follow a similar path to that of Polish migration flows remains dubious. Preliminary figures released from the Office for National Statistics in the UK tell another story. Since Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, there has been a consistent increase of migrants working in the UK in the first quarter of each year, compared to the last quarter of the previous year. However, this pattern was inter-

\textsuperscript{55} H. Salem, *The Frenzy: Why is Western Europe hysterical over a swarm of migrants that doesn’t actually exist?*, “Foreign Policy”, Jan 17 2014.

\textsuperscript{56} A. Dennett, op.cit., p. 114.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{58} C. Nygaard, A. Pasierbek, E. Francis-Brophy, op.cit., p. 9.

\textsuperscript{59} H. Rolfe, T. Fic, M. Lalani, M. Roman, M. Prohaska, L. Doudeva, op.cit., p. 29.
ruptured in 2014, just as the employment restrictions were relaxed in the UK. Statistics in May by the Office for National Statistics show a small reduction — a decrease of about 4,000 in the number of Romanian and Bulgarian nationals employed in the UK in the first three months immediately following the lifting of employment restrictions. The number of Romanian and Bulgarian-born workers in the UK has fallen to 140,000 in the first quarter of 2014, compared to the period of October to December 2013, when the number of EU2-born workers stood at 144,000. As such, preliminary statistics from the first quarter of 2014 fail to conform to standard migration theory’s predictions of an inflow of Romanian and Bulgarian nationals to the UK.

ROMANIAN AND BULGARIAN MIGRATION: 2014 WILL NOT BE A REPEAT OF 2004

The potential for future migration from Bulgaria and Romania to the UK after the transitional controls are lifted is often discussed in the context of the number of EU8 nationals who have chosen to settle in the UK after 2004. However, unlike EU8 migration — especially migration from Poland, which particularly accelerated upon EU accession in 2004 — migration from Bulgaria and Romania started accelerating prior to their countries’ accession and at the same time as EU8 migration. The number of foreign residents from Bulgaria and Romanian increased from 700,000 to almost 1.9 million from the end of 2003 to the end of 2007. This increase was not a result of enlargement, since Bulgaria and Romania were not members of the EU before 2007. Notwithstanding restrictions on

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60 R. McNeil, *It’s too Early to know whether the Number of Romanians and Bulgarians will Rise or Fall in 2014*, “The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford”, May 14th, 2014
access to labour markets in the UK, significant numbers of EU2 citizens have already relocated to the UK. Overall employment of EU2 nationals increased from 5924 workers in 2001 to 140 640 workers in 2013, a 22-fold rise in employment level\(^65\). In comparison, the increase in EU8 employment level of the same period was 17 fold. Because almost half of EU2 nationals are registered as self-employed, the extent to which transitional arrangements constituted a de facto barrier to migration or employment in the UK is likely to have been weakened by the exemption from transitional controls for self-employed migrants\(^66\).

This time around, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy opened their labour markets to arrivals from Bulgaria and Romania before the end of the 7-year transitory period, while UK, Ireland, Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg maintained restrictions until the end of 2013\(^67\). The migration potential from the EU2 countries is limited to a small percentage of the 8.6 million people in the age group 20-39 and their dependents; effectively, they would be dispersed across seven top EU and three non-EU destination countries. In the case of Denmark, the country opened its borders to EU2 citizens in 2009. Yet in 2010, Denmark attracted only 2500 Romanians and 1200 Bulgarians in spite of its robust welfare state and healthy economy\(^68\). As such, the UK is unlikely to experience EU2 migration on par with levels experienced in 2004.

According to chain, network, or gravity models of migration, the presence of migrant communities in potential destination countries influence future migration patterns\(^69\). Considering the Bulgarian and Romanian migration networks already established in Spain and Italy, it would make sense that migration flows of EU2 nationals remain robust over time. According to the European Labour Survey, about 26 000 Bulgarians and

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\(^{65}\) C. Nygaard, A. Pasierbek, E. Francis-Brophy, op.cit., p. 11.
\(^{66}\) Ibidem, p. 12.
\(^{67}\) T. Fic, op.cit., p. 4.
\(^{68}\) (Düvel 2013)
80 000 Romanians resided in the UK in 2009\textsuperscript{70}. These are relatively modest numbers compared to the number of Bulgarian and Romanian nationals residing in Spain (168 000 and 823 000 respectively) and Italy (46 000 and 888 000, respectively) as well as compared to the number of EU8 nationals settling in the UK (815 000)\textsuperscript{71}. Spain and Italy have received the overwhelming share of migrants from Bulgaria and Romania\textsuperscript{72}. For Romanians and Bulgarians, the relative geographic and linguistic (for Romanians) proximity to Italy and Spain in addition to pre-established networks are important pull-factors\textsuperscript{73}.

\textbf{THE 2008 ECONOMIC CRISIS AND RETURN MIGRATION}

The question of migration, especially from East to West, played a large role in the European Parliament election in May\textsuperscript{74}. The economic crisis of 2008 placed the question of migration higher on the political agenda of many countries\textsuperscript{75}. For populist politicians, the ‘threat’ of eastern migration yields firm electoral support and is an effective way to rally the masses\textsuperscript{76}. However, critics of migration fail to note that EU2 migration will make largely positive contributions to the host country’s economy. For instance, migration from EU2 countries to Spain and Italy resulted in an increase in these recipient countries’ GDP of about 1-1.5\% over the period of 2004-2009. Over the same period, migration from the EU8 countries to the UK resulted in an increase in GDP of approximately 1\%\textsuperscript{77}. Previous research suggests that EU8 migrants contribute substantially more through tax than they cost in terms of benefits and public services. For example, UCL

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{70} T. Fic, op.cit., p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{71} Ibidem, p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{72} T. Baas, H. Brucker, A. Hauptmann, op.cit., p. 51.
\item \textsuperscript{73} M. Kahanec, A. Zaiceva, K. Zimmerman, op.cit., p. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{75} A. Dennett,op.cit., p. 98.
\item \textsuperscript{77} T. Fic, op.cit., p. 6.
\end{itemize}
researchers found that between 2001 and 2011, EEA (European Economic Area) migrants paid 34% more in taxes than they received in benefits, in relation to UK-born citizens or migrants from outside the EEA. Recent migrants were 45% less likely to receive state benefits or tax credits than people native to the UK and 3% less likely to live in social housing\textsuperscript{78}. On average, this property seems likely to apply to EU2 migrants as well\textsuperscript{79}.

The recent economic crisis and the hostile atmosphere to migrants which followed may have induced some return migration or movement of workers within the EU\textsuperscript{80}. In a period of high unemployment and weak economic growth, the general public, policy makers, and companies become more aware of potential negative effects, real or imagined, that migrants have on the job prospects of natives\textsuperscript{81}. This shift in perception can mean that social pressure on migrants to leave will rise along with social tensions, ethnic cleavages, and feelings of nationalism. In a similar move, the UK Coalition Government made clear commitments in their 2010 agreement to reduce immigration levels by the introduction of a “cap on immigration” in order to “ensure cohesion and protect our public services”\textsuperscript{82}. In response to scaremongering tactics of the media and fears of ‘benefit tourism’, suggesting that large numbers would migrate in order to exploit Britain’s welfare system, the British government implemented restrictions on access of European migrants to welfare benefits at the end of 2013\textsuperscript{83}. Internal factors such as disappointment with the host country, poor wages or unfavourable working conditions and external factors such as a downturn in the UK economy, more job opportunities or increasing earnings in home countries have been identified as contributing to these

\textsuperscript{78} C. Dustmann, T. Frattini, \textit{The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK}, “UCL Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, Discussion paper” No. 22/23, Nov 2013.

\textsuperscript{79} T. Fic, op.cit., p. 7.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibidem, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{81} M. Kahanec, A. Zaiceva, K. Zimmerman, op.cit., p. 38.


\textsuperscript{83} A. Glennie, \textit{Romanian and Bulgarian Stats show up Immigration Scaremongering}, “The New Statesman”, May 14, 2014.
trends\textsuperscript{84}. Potentially due to language and cultural barriers, Central and Eastern European migrants undergo ‘brain waste’, and remain in underpaid roles in labour, domestic, agricultural, or construction work\textsuperscript{85}. Partly in response to such factors, as many as 500 000 Central and Eastern European workers have already left the UK\textsuperscript{86}.

**LIKE POLISH MIGRATION, ROMANIAN AND BULGARIAN MIGRATION IS MORE ‘LIQUID’**

Many migrants, especially those of Polish origin, are classified as temporary migrants\textsuperscript{87}. For instance, in 2007, the number of Polish citizens staying abroad temporarily was estimated at approximately 2.3 million, which covers 6.6\% of the total population\textsuperscript{88}. Polish registrants typically indicate that they initially intend to stay in the UK for only a short period, with around 60\% stating that they intended to stay for less than a year, and a further quarter unsure of how long they expect to stay\textsuperscript{89}. In addition to being temporary, much of Polish migration is also circular, with migrants working in the UK on a seasonal basis or only staying for a short period of time\textsuperscript{90}. Circular migration is based on a continual, long-term, and fluid relationship among countries that occupy an increasingly singular economic space\textsuperscript{91}. Many migrants no longer settle permanently, but move back and forth from their source country to receiving countries \textsuperscript{92}. In this case, labour migrants are very responsive to economic cycles, especially when there are no mobility restrictions for returning home and re-returning.

\textsuperscript{84} S. Pemberton, C. Stevens, op.cit., p. 1292.


\textsuperscript{86} S. Pemberton, C. Stevens, op.cit., p. 1292.

\textsuperscript{87} M. Kahanec, A. Zaiceva, K. Zimmerman, op.cit., p. 38.

\textsuperscript{88} (Kaczmarczyk 2014, p. 129)

\textsuperscript{89} S. Drinkwater, J. Eade, M. Garapich, op.cit., p. 165.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibidem, p. 177.


\textsuperscript{92} G. Engbersen, op.cit., p. 99.
to the host country\textsuperscript{93}. For example, a few years after the mass outflow in 2004, there were reports of the mass return of Poles to Poland due to the economic crisis which struck Europe in 2008\textsuperscript{94}. Poland was one of the few countries which escaped the downturn which hit the UK and the rest of Europe. Between 2004 and 2009, registered unemployment was cut in half in Poland\textsuperscript{95}.

The fairly stable migration patterns that marked the period from 1950-1990 have evolved into more intricate, transitory patterns in terms of transient settlement and fluctuating migration status\textsuperscript{96}. This pattern of multiple returns replaces the former trend of settlement in the destination country or single return to the country of origin, making Polish migration much more circular than 20 or 30 years earlier and more nomadic in its character\textsuperscript{97}. Instead of settlement migration, Polish workers are engaged increasingly in circular migration, when the worker returns home when a job is finished and may come back another year (seasonal) or when the worker travels to another country whenever they are required (i.e. small-scale construction work, home improvement, etc.)\textsuperscript{98}. With the individualisation of family relations in Central and Eastern Europe, migration patterns become less network-driven, with young migrants having fewer family responsibilities in their home country. Liquid migration, in reference to the ideas of Zygmunt Bauman, addresses the individualised migration patterns in which migrants relocate to new and multiple countries of destination given free borders and open labour markets\textsuperscript{99}. Due to its transitory, transnational, and temporary patterns, recent migration from Poland as well as other Central and Eastern European countries tend to be labelled as ‘liquid’ or ‘fluid’ migration. Polish migration no longer takes

\textsuperscript{93} M. Kahanec, A. Zaiceva, K. Zimmerman, op.cit., p. 38.
\textsuperscript{94} J. Isanski, A. Mleczko, R. Seredynska-Abou Eid, op.cit., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{95} A. White, op.cit., p. 27.
\textsuperscript{96} G. Engbersen, I. Grabowska-Lusinska, A. Leerkes, The rise of liquid migration? Old and new patterns of migration after EU enlargement, [in:] Interdisciplinary Conference on Migration, Economic Change, Social Challenge, University College London. April 6\textsuperscript{th} 2011, p. 117.
\textsuperscript{97} J. Isanski, A. Mleczko, R. Seredynska-Abou Eid, op.cit., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{98} G. Engbersen, I. Grabowska-Lusinska, A. Leerkes, op.cit., p. 118.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibidem, p. 3.
the form of a straightforward flow from home country to host country that finishes in permanent settlement\textsuperscript{100}. Migrants often travelled to more than one country with their stays either abroad or in Poland remaining usually temporary, and they frequently returned to Poland for short periods of time\textsuperscript{101}. Similar to the tendencies of contemporary Polish migration, migration from the EU2 countries has also been more circular and fluid in nature. According to the Annual Population Survey in the UK, over a third of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants who have arrived between 2007 and 2011 have already returned home\textsuperscript{102}. Research also identifies an increase in circular migration resulting from economic recession\textsuperscript{103}. With regard to temporary migration, rather than longer-term settlement, the recent crisis may have induced some return migration or relocation of mobile workers within the EU. In the case of Bulgarian workers, there was a drop in the number of Bulgarians in the UK between 2008 and 2009 (from 50 000 to 26 000)\textsuperscript{104}. With respect to Polish, Romanian, and Bulgarian migration, circular migration remains the rule and not the exception\textsuperscript{105}.

**CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, EU2 migration from Romania and Bulgaria in 2014 will not be a repeat of EU8 migration in 2004. Decriers have predicted a mass inflow of EU2 workers to the UK once transitional controls were lifted in January 2014. However, figures from the Office for National Statistics have shown that there has been a small reduction of about 4 000 Romanian and Bulgarian workers in the first quarter of 2014, immediately after transitional controls were lifted. These findings question standard migration theory’s assumption that the higher the differences in rates of pay and

\textsuperscript{100} E. Gozdziak, op.cit., p. 1.

\textsuperscript{101} J. Isanski, A. Mleczko, R. Seredynska-Abou Eid, op.cit., p. 5.

\textsuperscript{102} A. Glennie, J. Pennington, op.cit., p. 11.

\textsuperscript{103} H. Rolfe, T. Fic, M. Lalani, M. Roman, M. Prohaska, L. Doudeva, op.cit., p. 16.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibidem, p. 22.

GDP per capita, the higher the migration flow from poorer countries to richer countries. On the whole, the EU principle of free movement and free borders has undermined the exclusivity of the nation’s ability to regulate and control the movements of people. Migration patterns are becoming more and more temporary as young migrants return home with human capital, new talents, and financial resources. Eastern European migrants are regional ‘free movers’, not immigrants. With open borders, this new generation of global nomads more likely to embrace temporary circular and transnational mobility, motivated by fluctuations in economic demand, rather than choose long-term permanent settlement. As migration patterns will become more complex and more fluid and borders become more porous, Europe will need to reconfigure its approach to migration and integration. Free movement is a motor of prosperity in Europe, to the advantage of all member states. However, this system was designed when the EU was smaller and more economically homogeneous, and it is reasonable to consider reforms that equalize the distribution of costs and benefits of migration more amongst member states. With the future expansion of the EU, noticeably into the Western Balkans, the questions of migration, mobility, and social integration are issues that need to be urgently addressed by policymakers.

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106 G. Engbersen, op.cit., p. 98.
107 M. Kahanec, A. Zaiceva, K. Zimmerman, op.cit., p. 40.
109 A. Glennie, J. Pennington, op.cit., p. 4.
SUMMARY

Since 2004, the UK has enjoyed a decade of experience in managing migration from EU8 countries. This time around, how well founded are the fears that 2014 will see another ‘flood’ of migrants, on par with levels experienced in 2004? This essay argues that EU2 migration, from Romania and Bulgaria, will not be a repeat of 2004. To begin, this paper will examine the reasons why there was a twenty-fold discrepancy between official estimates of expected migrants following the 2004 enlargement. Then, by using Poland as a case study of typical migration flows after the 2004 migration period, this paper will show that—contrary to predictions based on standard migration theory—mass migration outflows in 2004 is not a good predictor of events to come in 2014. Among other factors, given that those who wanted to migrate to the UK from Romania and Bulgaria already have migrated pre-accession and more countries opened their labour markets in 2014 than they did in 2004, the UK is not likely to see a mass influx of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants as it did with those of Polish origin in 2004. However, like Polish migration, Romanian and Bulgarian migration will tend to be more circular and ‘fluid’.

Keywords: migration, immigration policy, United Kingdom, the European Union