Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia

Abstract: The aim of this study is to demonstrate the validity of the thesis that in Indonesia one can find institutions that characterize two power-sharing models which are considered opposites of one another in political theory – centripetalism and consociationalism. In consequence, the Indonesian power-sharing system should be viewed as a hybrid, or mixed, system, and not a typically centripetal system as is usually the case in the literature. At the beginning of this article, a short analysis of Indonesia’s political situation is given for the purpose of defining the factors which determined the introduction of inter-segmental power-sharing solutions in that country. This is followed by a description of the specificity of consociationalism and centripetalism. The article goes on to discuss specific institutions of both power-sharing models which exist in Indonesia and ends with some concluding remarks on the thesis advanced at the outset.

Keywords: Indonesia; hybrid power-sharing; territorial power-sharing; power-sharing; centripetal; consociational

Indonesian society is a plural one, as it is made up of different segments, including ethnic groups and religious communities. In societies of this type conflicts of an ethnic, religious, and communal nature often mark inter-segmental relations. A number of states inhabited by distinct ethnic and religious segments have worked out solutions aimed at limiting such conflicts and, consequently, stabilizing their political situation. When these solutions take on an extended or even a systemic nature, especially if

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they are associated with a formal, institutionalized inclusion in the governing process of politicians representing different segments of a plural society, we are dealing with inter-segmental power-sharing (Wilford, 2003). Countries that have implemented such a power-sharing system include Indonesia.

The aim of this study is to demonstrate the validity of the thesis that in Indonesia one can find institutions that characterize two power-sharing models that are considered opposites of one another in political theory – centripetalism and consociationalism. As a result, the Indonesian power-sharing system should be viewed as a hybrid, or mixed, system, rather than a centripetal system, as it is usually described in the popular political literature.

At the beginning of this article, a short analysis of Indonesia’s political situation is given for the purpose of defining the factors which determined the introduction of the inter-segmental power-sharing solutions in that country. This is followed by a description of the specificity of consociationalism and centripetalism. This order is determined by the fact that consociationalism is considered to be an older form of power-sharing than centripetalism. The article goes on to discuss specific institutions of both power-sharing models which exist in Indonesia and ends with some concluding remarks on the thesis advanced at the outset.

Indonesia and its Political Context

Indonesia, independent since 1945, is the world’s fourth most populous country, with a population of about 261 million inhabitants in 2016 (Worldometers, 2016). The Indonesian economy is one of the world’s largest. Indonesia occupies an area of almost 2 million km2, and its territory on the equatorial axis extends over 5,000 km. The country is made up of about 17,000 islands, over 6,000 of which are inhabited. Unique cultures have emerged on many Indonesian islands. Indonesian society is very divided ethnically and, to a lesser degree, also religiously. According to data from 2010, the largest ethnic group in Indonesia are the Javanese (a little over 40% of the entire population), followed by the Sundanese (approx. 15.5%), the Malay (approx. 3.7%), the Batak (approx. 3.6%) and the Madurese (approx. 3%) (Ananta et al., 2013). The share of any of the several hundred other native ethnic groups in Indonesia’s population is under 3%. Among the immigrant population, the most

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2 Indonesia’s nominal GDP in 2015 was approx. 862 billion USD, making the country the 5th largest economy in Asia and the 16th in the world (World Bank, 2016).

3 According to Macdonald (2013, p. 4), there are even “over one thousand ethnic and subethnic segments” in Indonesia.
numerous are the Chinese (approx. 1.2%). According to data from 2010, the vast majority of Indonesians, approx. 87%, are Muslim (overwhelmingly Sunni); the number of Christians, (Protestants and Catholics) is just under 10%; and Hindus represent approx. 1.7% (Index Mundi, 2015).4

The introduction, mostly during the democratization wave in 1998–2002, of institutions which are typical of inter-segmental power-sharing systems was determined by three basic factors. First, smaller ethnic groups feared that the Javanese, who were politically and economically superior, would vigorously pursue their interests at the expense of theirs and the state. As is shown by Donald L. Horowitz (2013, p. 58), certain electoral systems could give the inhabitants of Java or the ethnic Javanese, a sufficient number of votes to enable them to single-handedly elect the president of Indonesia. Smaller ethnic groups’ fear of Javanese dominance was made greater by the latter’s preponderant influence in Indonesia’s political life during the authoritarian period,5 and by the fact that many Javanese migrate from the overpopulated island of Java to other islands. Christians, especially those who live in the Maluku Islands, in certain areas of Sulawesi, and also in the Indonesian part of New Guinea, are especially fearful of dominance by the Javanese, most of whom are Muslim. The majority of Indonesia’s Christians belong to small ethnic groups.

Second, when the democratic changes began in 1998,6 part of Indonesia’s political elite, mostly Javanese, feared the country’s territorial disintegration and, more specifically, the secession of certain of its regions, as exemplified by East Timor’s independence in 2002. Separatist tendencies in independent Indonesia were at one time very vivid and, to a lesser degree, continue to persist in the northern portions of Sumatra, in the province of Aceh (despite the signing in 2005 of a peace agreement between local separatists and the Indonesian authorities), which abounds in deposits of oil and natural gas, and in the Indonesian portion of New Guinea, in the provinces of Papua and West Papua, which have various natural resources such

4 For more on religious divisions in Indonesia, see Macdonald (2013, p. 6–7).
5 Horowitz (2013, p. 59) notes that during the presidency of Suharto (who governed uninterruptedly from 1967 to 1998), the Javanese not only enjoyed key influence on the central government but through the intermediary of retired Indonesian army officers made up “the core of political control” beyond Java, on the so-called external Indonesian islands.
6 The changes began with the resignation of President Suharto following a wave of popular protests in 1998, and with the first multi-party elections in 1999.
as gold, copper, silver, natural gas and wood.\textsuperscript{7} Both provinces and Aceh were given a special autonomous status.\textsuperscript{8}

In addition, separatist currents were quite strong until recently in multi-ethnic Maluku, in the eastern part of the Malay Archipelago, in the present provinces of Maluku and North Maluku, where some ethnic groups are Muslim and some Christian. On several occasions (1950–63, 1999–2002), Maluku was the scene of bloody conflicts between followers of the two religions who were, at the same time, members of various ethnic groups. Aspirations to gain broad autonomy also emerged in the east-central part of Sumatra (in the regions of Riau, presently divided into two provinces – Riau and the Riau Archipelago), which has various natural resources and is inhabited in large measure by Malays, Bataks and Chinese; on the Minahasa Peninsula in north-eastern Sulawesi in the multi-ethnic province of North Sulawesi, whose population is in large measure Christian; and on the oil-rich island of Borneo, in the province of East Kalimantan, to which Indonesians of different ethnic backgrounds migrate. The provinces of Central Kalimantan (once part of East Kalimantan province) and West Kalimantan are periodically the scene of conflicts between the native Dayaks and Malay, and migrants from the island of Madura, the Madurese.

Horowitz (2013, p. 59) thinks that a third important factor influencing the formation of institutions typical of inter-segmental power-sharing in Indonesia at the turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} to the 21\textsuperscript{st} centuries was the concentration of support for Indonesia’s most important political parties at the time in different regions of the country\textsuperscript{9} – a situation which was a threat to political stability.

As the above summary indicates, conditions in Indonesia make it possible for separatisms, and of ethnic and communal conflicts to arise. The largest of them (in the Indonesian part of New Guinea and in Aceh) took place prior to the introduction of power-sharing. Conflicts of lesser intensity also took place at the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. At present, the intensity of separatist currents in Indonesia is low, and ethnic and communal conflicts occur rarely. Presumably, this state of affairs is caused in part by the functioning of institutions typical of inter-segmental power-sharing.

\textsuperscript{7} The Indonesian, western portion of New Guinea, where the provinces of Papua and West Papua are located, used to be called Irian Barat (West Irian), Irian Jaya, and subsequently Papua.

\textsuperscript{8} For more on separatisms and autonomy in Aceh and Indonesian Papua, see McGibbon, 2004.

\textsuperscript{9} This was especially the case for different parts of Java. However, some parties relied on support from Bali, the so-called Outer Islands or the Christian areas of eastern Indonesia (Horowitz, 2013, p. 59).
Consociationalism and Centripetalism

Two models of inter-segmental (especially inter-ethnic) power-sharing are distinguished and opposed to each other in the abundant literature on the subject:10 consociationalism and centripetalism (also called “integrative power-sharing”) (Sisk, 1996; Horowitz, 2014; Wolff, 2010; Reilly, 2007; Basedau, 2011). The logic of consociationalism is based on the concept of primordialism which, according to Arend Lijphart (1995, p. 855), presupposes that ethnicity understood as ethnic identity “is an inherited characteristic and, if not permanently fixed, at least very difficult to change.” From a primordialist perspective, the idea of creating pan-ethnic (or pan-religious) societies in multi-segmental (especially multi-ethnic) states seems utopian. The direct opposite of primordialism is instrumentalism. According to this concept, the nature of ethnicity is fluid and manipulable (Lijphart, 1995, p. 855) and this carries important political consequences. Proponents of the instrumentalist approach think that ethnicity can be roused to pursue particular aims but, on the other hand, that its significance can be reduced for the purpose of building pan-ethnic societies. The instrumentalist approach seems to be supported by those politicians and constitutionalists in multi-ethnic states who see no need to introduce in such states systemic political solutions that reflect existing ethnic divisions. In consequence, they usually opt either for authoritarian structures or the institutions of liberal majoritarian democracy. In the middle, between primordialism and instrumentalism, lies constructivism.11 Admittedly, its proponents are in agreement with the primordialist view that ethnicity is something given or set in advance, but they also state that it can then be shaped for the purpose of attaining some desirable goal having to do with, for example, the political modernization of the state. Constructivist premises serve as a basis for the logic of centripetalism.

10 It is worth mentioning, however, that the so-called ‘complex power sharing’ theory is under development (see Wolff, 2012). In short, the theory’s aim – as perceived by Wolff – is to suggest the best solutions for inter-segmental accommodation in (deeply) divided societies. Such solutions can be borrowed from different power-sharing models as well as other conflict resolution approaches. While it seems to be a normative theory (if partly based on selected empirical examples), in Indonesia a hybrid model of inter-segmental power sharing (centripetal with consociational additions) has taken shape. Thus, the Indonesian case can tell us about something that is purely empirical. On the other hand, the Indonesian case (or the similar Nigerian one, see Trzciński 2016a) is one of the empirical examples that might be helpful in the further development of a normative theory.

The theory of consociationalism presupposes that when society in a given state is plural in character and, especially, strongly divided ethnically, individual ethnic groups should possess their own distinct representation in state government (in the form of ethnic parties, for example) and thus to be able to participate in political decision making. Such a state entrenches existing ethnic divisions (Lijphart, 1980; 2008). Centripetalism presupposes the opposite – the possibility of political integration of the groups’ elites above segmental (especially ethnic) divisions, thus weakening the importance of the latter. Centripetalism, in contrast to consociationalism, by definition promotes ethnically neutral legal practices concerning the status of individuals and groups in multi-segmental (especially multi-ethnic) conditions – something that is supposed to strengthen the process of integration, the reaching of which is the purpose of centripetal institutions.

The nucleus of consociationalism is made up of four institutions (Lijphart, 2008, p. 42): grand coalitions (such as, for example, governments formed by segmental (e.g. ethnic) parties or governments made up of politicians representing specific segments of plural society or preferably originating from all of those groups); cultural autonomy for individual linguistic groups (if they live in one specific area then the autonomy can also be of a territorial nature, for example, that of ethnic federalism); proportionality in political representation and in the appointment of members of the civil service; and a limited veto right for the minorities (taking at times the form of a requirement to obtain a qualified majority for certain types of changes to the law). Among the states that have, at least in part, implemented consociationalism at home are Cyprus, Lebanon, Malaysia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Empirical centripetalism (in Nigeria and Indonesia) is made up of the following institutional solutions (Reilly, 2007, pp. 83–91; 2011a, pp. 291–295; 2011b, pp. 57–64): a territorial structure within the framework of which large ethnic groups are “broken down” so their members live in distinct, preferably multi-ethnic territorial and administrative units – something that is supposed make the elites of one and the same large group representing various regions compete, for example for funds from the central budget; the constitutional requirement for candidates in presidential elections to obtain a territorial distribution of votes (the support of the electorate in a considerable number of the given state’s regions), the fulfillment of which is necessary to assume the office of president; and supra-regional and inter-

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12 On further developments of the consociational theory based on the case of Northern Ireland, see Taylor, 2012.

13 Thus far, full centripetalism was implemented only in these two countries.
ethnic political parties required to form ethnically heterogeneous lists of candidates in different elections.14

**Indonesian Centripetal Institutions**

Most institutions of Indonesian power-sharing are typical of centripetalism. These are: 1) a territorial structure that “breaks up” large ethnic groups so that they end up living in distinct territorial and administrative units (hereafter called a centripetal territorial structure); 2) the requirement of a territorial distribution of votes (support) in presidential elections, the fulfillment of which is necessary to win presidential office; and 3) supra-regional and inter-ethnic political parties.

**The Centripetal Territorial Structure**

The history of the formation of a centripetal territorial structure in Indonesia goes back to the reforms of 1999, as a result of which, despite various federalist projects promoted by some politicians and constitutionalists, Indonesia remained a unitary (art. 1[1], 18 and 25A of the Constitution of Indonesia, 1945), but decentralized state. The decentralization of a highly centralized state that had been ruled in authoritarian fashion began with the creation of 26 provinces (provinsi, in 2014 there were 34) divided into smaller territorial administration districts (kabupaten) and municipal areas (kota) (art. 18 of the Constitution). Decentralization was aimed at, among other things, a more equitable division of budgetary resources for, as Horowitz (2013, p. 71) shows, during the authoritarian period “there was great inequality in revenue-expenditure exchanges between the center and the various regions” of Indonesia. It had to do with the fact that regions rich in resources, such as Aceh, Riau (presently the provinces of Riau and the Riau Archipelago) and Irian Jaya (presently the provinces of Papua and West Papua) de facto subsidized the development of the most populous island Java, while they suffered from under-investment.

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14 The fourth element of centripetalism is mentioned in the literature – the use of so-called preferential voting, in the form of either a single transferable vote or an alternative vote, in parliamentary elections (especially to the lower chamber). Such voting, through the ranking of candidates, makes it possible for voters to indicate preferences among candidates of different parties. In the case of centripetalism, the aim of such voting would be to reduce chances of the election to parliament of politicians showing little restraint in their political views and actions, particularly with regard to inter-segmental relations. Preferential voting systems functioned for a time in Sri Lanka, Fiji and in Papua New Guinea, among other places (Reilly, 2007, pp. 115–118; McCulloch, 2013a, 2013b).
The specificity of Indonesia’s decentralization consisted mainly in the ceding by the central authorities of some of its administrative, fiscal and political prerogatives,\(^{15}\) not as much to the provincial level as to the district and municipal area levels within individual provinces. This type of decentralization was supposed to limit the political competencies of the provincial authorities to administering a small number of matters which continued to lie within the jurisdiction of the central government (such as military or religious matters) and to manage in each province those aspects which were beyond the jurisdiction of individual districts and municipal areas (like, for example, the planning of transportation infrastructure). As Horowitz (2013, p. 73) noted, the economic idea behind decentralization was to have as much as 90% of the funds transferred from the central authorities to the districts and municipal areas and only 10% to the provinces. The limitation of political power and financial resources at the provincial level had to do with the fact that in 1999 it was principally at this territorial level that “separatist sentiment and demands for autonomy” were to be found (Horowitz, 2012, p. 72).

The centripetal dimension of Indonesia’s territorial structure reforms can be most clearly seen in the continuous cutting out of new provinces from those already in existence. And so, in 1999, North Maluku was carved out from part of Maluku, in 2000 Gorontalo from North Sulawesi, in 2003 West Papua from Papua, in 2004 the Riau Archipelago from Riau, in 2012 North Kalimantan from East Kalimantan. The creation of an additional 11 basic territorial units by the year 2025 is being discussed or has already been decided in the lower chamber of the Indonesian parliament, the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR).

Such units include new provinces mainly set aside from such present provinces as Aceh, Papua, West Papua, East Kalimantan and West Kalimantan (Max, 2012). Those are provinces where the potential for separatist currents, demands for wider autonomy, or ethnic, religious and communal conflicts continue to exist. Legislators do not explicitly point to those factors as being significant for Indonesia’s ongoing decentralization. It is difficult, however, to believe that, for example, the suggested creation of a total of five new provinces in New Guinea out of the present two of Papua and West Papua is coincidental. Many Indonesian politicians have for years held the view that the danger represented by the Papuan’s drive for independence could be far greater than the separatist currents which exist in the province of Aceh, because almost all inhabitants of Aceh are Muslims, as are most Indonesians, whereas the Pauans living in Indonesia are mainly Christian (Emmerson, 2000, p. 101).

\(^{15}\) For more on devolved functions to local governments, see Prasetiamartati, 2013.
Another centripetal dimension of the reform of Indonesia’s territorial structure can be seen in the division of Java – Indonesia’s most populous island, inhabited mostly by the country’s largest and most influential ethnic group, the Javanese – into as many as six provinces: Jakarta, Banten, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java.

The Requirement of Territorial Distribution of Support in Presidential Elections

According to the Indonesian Constitution of 1945, (and following the Third Amendment from 9 November 2001 and the Fourth Amendment from 11 August 2002), the president is elected by universal suffrage (art. 6A [1]) for a five-year term (art. 7), and is head of state and, at the same time, the head of government (art. 4 [1] and art. 5). The same person cannot hold the presidential office more than twice (art. 7). The candidate for president can be proposed by a political party or a coalition of parties (art. 6A [2]). To win a presidential election in Indonesia, it is necessary not only to obtain 50% of votes from the entire country but, at the same time, at least 20% of votes from at least half of its provinces (art. 6A [3] of the Constitution). If no candidate manages to secure such support, a second round is held between the two candidates who obtained the largest number of votes in the first round. The candidate who wins most votes in the second round becomes the head of state (art. 6A [4]).

The constitutional requirement for candidates in presidential elections to secure a territorial distribution of votes, the meeting of which in the first electoral round is indispensable to win the office of head of state in Indonesia’s presidential system of government, is intended to help select a “pan-ethnic” president (Reilly 2011a, p. 292), who could play an “important conflict-reducing role” (Sisk, 1996, p. 55). As Benjamin Reilly (2011a, p. 292) has noted, an excellent example of a centrist Indonesian politician with conciliatory skills in inter-segmental relations is Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a Javanese who had won the presidency twice, in 2004 and 2009, i.e., at a time when the requirement in question was in force.

There has never been a case in Indonesia when a leading candidate has failed to win the presidential office in the first round for failing to meet the requirement of the territorial distribution of votes. This fact does not indicate that the requirement in question is practically immaterial. Quite the opposite, such a state of affairs leads one to conclude that the winners of Indonesia’s presidential elections are politicians whose views and actions are restrained, especially in matters that are delicate for inter-ethnic
relations, and this allows them to win a wider pool of support than the ethnic group and religious community they are part of.

**Supra-regional and inter-ethnic political parties**

After the fall of the dictatorship in 1998, Indonesia introduced party pluralism. Most significantly in the context of centripetalism, in 1999 Indonesia adopted a requirement for political parties to be supra-regional and inter-ethnic in character (Mietzner, 2008). By the Law of the Republic of Indonesia on General Elections no. 3/1999 (art. 82) (Horowitz, 2013, p. 69), to be recognized as a political party and be able to participate in elections, a political organization initially had to possess regional branches in at least one-third of all provinces, and in at least half of all districts and municipal areas in each of these provinces. This requirement was subsequently modified. After the 2009 elections, nine country-wide political parties emerged in Indonesia. Their representatives sat in the lower house of parliament and came to an understanding in the matter of tightening the centripetal requirements concerning the operation of political parties and their participation in elections (IFES, 2014, p. 2). According to the Law of the Republic of Indonesia on the General Election of Members of House of Representatives, People’s Representatives Council, and Regional House of Representatives no. 8/2012 (art. 8 [2] [b] – [d]), in order to operate, a new political organization or political party which did not win any parliamentary seats in the 2009 elections needs to have branches in all Indonesian provinces, in at least 75% of districts and municipal areas in each of those provinces, and in 50% of smaller administrative units making up the districts and municipal areas.

The law presently in force in Indonesia thus requires that political parties be of a strictly supra-regional and inter-ethnic nature. In consequence, this prevents the functioning of regional, including ethnic, parties. The exceptions to this centripetal rule are the consociational solutions discussed in the further parts of this article and allowing for the existence of regional, de facto ethnic, parties in the provinces of Aceh, Papua, and West Papua.

**Indonesian Consociational Institutions**

Even though most of the inter-segmental power-sharing institutions in Indonesia are centripetal in nature, that state has also adopted a number of consociational solutions. These are 1) special autonomy for chosen provinces, and 2) segmental (i.e. religious and ethnic) parties. The first of these solutions is an emanation of one of the four main consociational institutions – autonomy for segments, while the second corresponds
directly with the consociational logic of representing group rights and, in consequence, the consent for the existence of segmental parties.

**Special Autonomy**

A specific element of Indonesian decentralization has to do with the fact that certain provinces (in 2016 there are five of them, including two municipalities – the capital Jakarta and Yogyakarta, governed by a local sultan) have different powers than the rest. One can assume that the basis for obtaining a special, i.e., broad autonomy, by certain Indonesian provinces is made up of three types of factors: 1) extensive, especially in the past, armed separatist currents (such as in the case of the provinces of Aceh, Papua and West Papua); 2) considerable respect enjoyed by the traditional ruler in the municipality-province of Yogyakarta; and 3) the capital status of the municipality-province Jakarta.

The special autonomy of Aceh, Papua, and West Papua, giving these provinces significant powers unavailable to other provinces, is important from the perspective of consociationalism.

In the case of Aceh, special autonomy under Law No. 11/2006 on the Governing of Aceh, makes possible above all the functioning of regional parties in this province (see the next part of this article) and Sharia Law, and the passing and implementation within the scope of this Law of provincial acts of law (art. 16[2], art. 42[1e], Chapters 17–19). It is the only such case at the provincial level in Indonesia.

The Law on the Governing of Aceh also provides for other important planes of autonomy. And so, in the case of international competencies what is important is especially that fact that the provincial parliament, the Aceh House of People’s Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh, DPRA), has the right to consider and consult with the Indonesian central government on drafts of international agreements that would affect provincial matters within the jurisdiction of the Aceh Government (art. 8[1]). The DPRA also enjoys a similar right in connection with those plans of the central government concerning international cooperation that is related in any manner with Aceh province (art. 23 [1h]). Similar provisions of the law on autonomy apply to internal matters. And so, the DPRA has the right to consider and consult with the lower chamber of the Indonesian parliament, the DPR, those provisions that are to

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17 In this respect, it is possible to find similarities between Indonesian decentralization and, for example, the devolution process in the United Kingdom.

18 This law is also called “law on autonomy” in the further parts of this article in reference to Aceh.
affect to matters lying within the jurisdiction of the Aceh Government (art. 8[2]). In turn, administrative decisions of the central government concerning Aceh are to be consulted with the governor of this province, who is elected in direct elections by the inhabitants of Aceh (art. 8[3]). The above-mentioned regulations – as an emanation of sorts of the “nothing about us without us” idea – should in practice entail the necessity for the central government to secure the consent of the Aceh legislative or executive authorities in the said areas. In fact, however, the central Indonesian authorities have reserved the right to supervise the “implementation of affairs” which lay in the competence of the Aceh authorities (art. 11[1]).

A significant economic aspect of Aceh’s autonomy is the possibility for this province to obtain up to 70% of the revenues that Indonesia earns from the exploitation of Achenese oil and natural gas (art. 181 [1b. 5–6] and [3], art. 182). The central government nevertheless has the right to co-manage these resources in the province along with the Aceh government (art. 160 [1]).

Regarding Acehnese tradition, the law on autonomy allows in turn for the province of Aceh to use its own symbols – flags, coat of arms, and hymn (art. 246–248). This law also allows for the functioning in Aceh of certain autochthonous institutions (art. 98), including above all Wali Nangroe, in whose competence is mainly the supervision of the functioning of other traditional institutions, the cultivation of local culture and the granting of traditional titles and degrees (art. 96).

The provisions of law on the governing of Aceh diverge in some questions, to the detriment of the province of Aceh, from those negotiated by the separatists of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) and the Indonesian government, as part of the Helsinki Agreement of 2005, which officially put an end to the conflict between the two sides (MoU, 2005). Nevertheless, in Aceh the special autonomy has been implemented, in contrast to Papua and West Papua,19 where the special autonomy, although formally guaranteed by the Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for the Papua Province, has yet to be implemented and it is not known if it will not be defined anew in the future. The present law on special autonomy for Papua (and de facto for West Papua) contains many provisions analogous to those in the law regulating the special autonomy in Aceh. While they are not discussed in this article in consideration of their, for now, mostly theoretical nature,20 it is worthwhile to take note of one specific provision of the law – one that concerns the allocation of

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19 When the law on Papuan autonomy was being adopted, only one province existed in Indonesian New Guinea (Papua, formerly Irian Jaya).

20 For more on this subject, see Trzciński, 2016b.
extraordinary financial resources to raise the low standard of living of the inhabitants of Papua and West Papua in relation to that of other Indonesians (point h in the Introduction and art. 34 [3d-f]).

Segmental Parties

Although basic (in terms of power-sharing) Indonesian regulations concerning the functioning of political parties are centripetal in nature (such parties need to be supra-regional and inter-ethnic), segmental parties typical of consociationalism are also allowed to function. In contrast to Nigeria – a state which, such as Indonesia, has mostly centripetal institutions of power-sharing – two types of segmental parties may function in Indonesia – religious parties (i.e., parties making direct reference to religious values, which constitute the party’s program foundation) and ethnic parties referred to as regional parties.

Among the religious parties, only the Islamic ones play an important role on the political stage, because the population of Indonesia is overwhelmingly Muslim. There are many parties of this type in Indonesia, but four of them are particularly important, as their members are deputies in the lower chamber of parliament, the DPR. They are the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), and the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP). Following the 2014 elections to the DPR, representatives of those parties occupy about 31% of the chamber (173 deputies out of a total of 560 seats, in 2016) (DPR, 2016). Islamic parties have achieved significant political influence since members of three such parties (the PKB, PAN, and PPP) became members of the present cabinet of President Joko Widodo.

On the other hand, the role of Christian-Democratic parties, or those that reach out to Christian values or voters is almost insignificant. This includes the largest of them – the Indonesian Democratic Party of Devotion (Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia, PKDI) – which manages to gain a measure of support, especially from the

\[21\] This aspect of the special autonomy was partially implemented. There remain, however, serious irregularities in the distribution of special aid resources (Mote, 2016).

\[22\] At first glance, religious parties in Indonesia, especially the Islamic ones, may be perceived as centripetal in nature since they operate across many ethnic groups and regions. However, they are inclusive for the members of one religion while, at the same time, excluding members of others.

\[23\] For more on the link between the functioning of religious parties and the low quality of democracy in Indonesia, see Aspinall, 2010.
Christian inhabitants of Flores or from the Papuans, but has been unable to cross the 2.5% electoral threshold in elections to the DPR.

The functioning of regional parties, which are de facto ethnic parties, is in turn legally guaranteed within the framework of special autonomy in the provinces of Aceh, Papua, and West Papua. For the time being, ethnic parties function only in Aceh, where the autonomy has been implemented. These parties operate in the province next to the centripetal parties of a supra-regional and inter-ethnic character and compete with them in elections. The ethnic parties in Aceh are only allowed to take part in elections to the provincial parliament and the councils of districts and municipal areas (art. 1.2 of MoU, 2005; Chapter 11 of Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 11/2006). Despite the limited territorial reach of the ethnic parties in Aceh, the central government’s acquiescence to their existence is a departure from centripetalism’s ethnically neutral policy of not supporting groups’ rights.

In practice, two parties in Aceh are highly significant. They are the Aceh Party (Partai Aceh), based on the support of members and sympathizers of GAM and the largest in the provincial legislature with 29 representatives out of 100, and the Aceh National Party (Partai Nasional Aceh, PNA). In 2012, the inhabitants of Aceh elected the new provincial governor, Zaini Abdullah from the Aceh Party, for a five-year term by a majority of votes. Together, the ethnic parties of Aceh won about 40% of votes in the 2014 elections, which means that the majority of the provinces inhabitants voted for non-ethnic parties (Gayo, 2014) despite the fact that most of Aceh’s population are ethnic Acehnese.

The right to establish regional (de facto ethnic) parties is also guaranteed in the Law on Special Autonomy for the Papua Province (Chapter 7) and applies presently to the two provinces of Papua and West Papua. Given that the special autonomy has not yet been fully introduced in those provinces, however, the possibility for autochthonous Papuans to establish political parties (art. 28[3]) remains a legal dead letter.

Conclusion

Indonesia adopted a hybrid model of power-sharing – one that combines institutional arrangements that, in the opinion of many political theoreticians are characteristic of two different and theoretically opposite models of inter-segmental power-sharing: centripetalism and consociationalism. Although both the theory of centripetalism and that of consociationalism are empirical in character because they emerged as a result of observations of political realities in multi-segmental countries and are based on an in-depth analysis of real examples of power-sharing, the conclusions that follow from such analyses are at times of an excessively abstract nature. The Indonesian example
Krzysztof Trzciński demonstrates that one should not be tightly bound by a set theoretical framework, for some institutions of the two power-sharing models need not be mutually exclusive in practice, even if the concepts they derive from are contradictory. It is worthwhile to remember, that centripetalism tries to overcome differences between segments of plural society and integrate its members – including and especially the political class – above ethnic cleavages. In contrast, the institutions of consociationalism, although also working toward building compromises in a plural society, taken together entrench segmental, e.g. ethnic or religious divisions. In Indonesia there is no attempt to make use of the totality of centripetal and consociational institutions at the same time, and the leading centripetal approach is enriched by just a few arrangements of the consociational type, namely by territorial autonomy and ethnic parties at the local level in Aceh (and, formally constituted but still waiting for full implementation, in Papua and West Papua) and religious parties at the central level.

The example of Indonesia shows, therefore, that certain arrangements which are ideologically opposite because they are based on constructivism on the one hand and primordialism on the other, can complement each other and serve together to stabilize the political situation in a plural society in which such a task is certainly not a simple one.

The use in Indonesia of a combination of centripetal and consociational arrangements is certainly not a remedy to all ills that exist or arise in Indonesia’s multicultural environment, nor can it be. It does not eliminate religious tensions between Muslims and Christians, although it certainly contributes to their reduction and to the fact that they tend to manifest themselves at a local community level. Indonesian power-sharing is also not a remedy for the Islamic extremism present in Indonesia although, of course, the phenomenon of extremism in any country can be seen as extra-systemic by definition.

Although instances of separatism, ethnic, religious and communal conflicts has declined in Indonesia since the introduction in that country of power-sharing institutions, it is not possible to ascribe this directly and solely to the application of the hybrid type of power-sharing. Many other factors, such as economic growth, the development of education, and a growing urbanization rate could just as well have contributed to the declining importance of conflict in relations between segmental groups, to the building of inter-segmental accommodation and, by the same token to inter-ethnic and inter-religious contacts and interdependencies. Moreover, the rapid and often effective reaction of the army and police has certainly been a significant factor limiting the scale of conflicts, when they occur, between members of various ethnic groups and religious communities.
It is worthwhile to stress once again that – with the exception of religious parties – consociational institutions in Indonesia are present only to a limited degree. These were designed for selected regions whose affiliation with Indonesia gives rise to reservations on the part of the autochthonous political elites. The statutorily guaranteed solutions of a specific autonomy and regional (de facto ethnic) political parties in Papua and West Papua could very well never be instituted. One may thus presume that their introduction was not intended from the very outset (Trzciński, 2016b). The law on special autonomy for the Indonesian portion of New Guinea was adopted at a time when pro-independence currents there were strong and autochthonous inhabitants outnumbered immigrants from other parts of Indonesia. This situation has now changed diametrically, and Papuans presently represent less than half the population of the provinces of Papua and West Papua,24 while their pro-independence activities have been pacified by the Indonesian army.

In general, consociational institutions in Indonesia can be recognized as complementary to the dominant centripetalism in those areas where centripetal arrangements were not satisfactory for some segments (ethnic or religious), and thus far they should be viewed as having a stabilizing effect on the Indonesian political system as a whole.

References:


24 This is due to the state-sponsored policy of transmigration (transmigrasi), i.e., the transfer of populations from other, overpopulated regions of Indonesia. For more on this subject, see Elmslie, 2010.


MoU between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement signed


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