THE EUROPEANIZATION
OF THE POLISH SAFETY POLICY
IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS PARTICIPATION
IN NATIONAL ARMED MILITARY FORCES MISSIONS
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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INTRODUCTION

For some time now, an issue of the Europeanization has been quite deeply explored in literature on political science. Numerous authors take on that subject in a variety of contexts, which means that it is a problem that is very interesting from a scientific point of view. There are plenty of Polish scientists researching this area, as well as a great number of foreign publications. An interest of Europeanization’s processes is most often investigated in the context of public politics.

In this article, by the use of a nomological – deductive approach, the author endeavors to make an explanation of the term Europeanization and also to show to what extend and how the Europeanization of Polish armed forces succeeded in the context of their participation in missions lead by the European Union.

The author hypothesizes that a result of the Europeanization’s processes Polish armed forces had an opportunity to participate in various missions and at the same time they started to socialize, as well as to adjust to European realities and organizational, logistical and political standards.
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE EUROPEANIZATION

In numerous debates, discussions or any other forms of exchanging thoughts and ideas the term “Europeanization” is not uniformly understood. One can risk a thesis that a taxonomy of this notion is not homogeneous. It causes some sort of insufficiency. Representatives of social sciences have a different view on the Europeanization than representatives of economic sciences, and if it is not enough – economists perceive it in a completely alternative way. In this article the author focuses on understanding the Europeanization in the context of social sciences with a particular compliance of a science of politics.

In political science the Europeanization is defined as an influence of a European integration on member states. T.G. Grosse claims that this notion is much wider¹. While analyzing Europeanization’s processes, a starting point should be an assumption that the European integration is some kind of endeavor to build a political and economy system in Europe.

It embraces the creation of a government entity in international relations, therefore it serves as a realization of geopolitical goals. It is related to a competition for leadership and an endeavor to establish mutual political relations between certain states – members and community institutions. Therefore, it means that the Europeanization embraces building of precise connections between a national and European standard.

Some authors define the Europeanization as an export of cultural norms and values represented by most of the members of the Community, for others it is a synonym of an integration process².

The Europeanization can be also be considered as an influence, a convergence or a response of actors or institutions to actions of the European Union, which consist of a process of constructing, spreading, institutionalizing of formal and informal rules, procedures, paradigms, styles and

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variety of beliefs and norms that are first of all defined and consolidated in a process of creating politics on the European Union’s level, and then they are accepted as a part of a logic of a national discourse, identity, political structures and a national policy of a state³.

That notion opens up a lot of ways to contemplations on the European integration in a cultural, economic, political and social assessment. Therefore, the Europeanization means exerting an influence on national public politics and affecting them. In this context, processes of Europeanization happen in relation to practically all public policies lead by a state. Therefore, the Europeanization can influence certain branches of law, pension systems, social insurance systems, educational and linguistic systems or the ones concerning foreign and defense politics.

In the context of defense politics, and more broadly in safety and defense politics, it can be indicated that Europeanization processes happening in a former second pillar of the European Union have an influence on national armed forces that participate in the policy. A particular manifestation of happening Europeanization’s processes is the participation of Polish armed forces in missions of a military nature.

THE PARTICIPATION OF POLAND IN MILITARY MISSIONS

The European Union lead about 17 civil missions, 7 military ones and only one assorted⁴. Two years after an initialization of the European Security and Defence Policy⁵, the European Council assumed that the European Union possesses an appropriate potential to be able to conduct

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⁵ In 2001.
operations of crisis management. In the year 2003 the General Affairs and External Relations Council specified abilities of the European Union as completely sufficient for realization of Petersberg tasks⁶, even though some could still notice essential deficiencies⁷. What is more, in 2003 the first mission of a military nature had been initialized⁸.

On the 31st of March 2003 the European Union took over from NATO the duty of leading an international mission called “CONCORDIA” in the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. It happened as an answer to an official request of the Macedonian authorities⁹, as well as a decision of the North Atlantic Treaty, in which the operation *Allied Harmony* was determined to be ended¹⁰.

“CONCORDIA” was the first mission lead by the European Union, in which NATO’s capabilities and resources had been used. 400 soldiers, personnel from 13 member states of the European Union of that time and 14 other countries participated in the task¹¹.

France had become a leading state in this operation and the operational commander was German admiral Reiner Feist¹², who was stationed in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.

The operation reflected an open nature of a common foreign policy and protection via a continuation of the North Atlantic Treaty’s works. Its

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⁹ A realization of this mission and taking it over by the European Union at the same time was possible thanks to a few reasons. First of all, main political parties representing ethnic Albanians were joint in a government after selections in 2002, second of all, an international engagement in this region of actions of OSCE, NATO and EU continued. And thirdly, in this case a balance has been achieved on a Macedonian political arena.


¹² Later commanders were: Pierre Maral from France, Luis Nelson from Portugal.
main purpose was to support the security of international observers from the OSCE and EU, to ensure a visible presence in the field and not to let a civil war in Macedonia start\textsuperscript{13}.

The budget for the operation established for 6 months was about 6.2 million Euro. “CONCORDIA” was a confirmation of the abilities of Berlin Plus agreements\textsuperscript{14} and a possibility of cooperation between the European Union and NATO. The European Union’s tasks were: patrolling, inquiring, supervising, situational warning and all actions of a liaison nature. Even though the mission was quite limited, it allowed the operationalization of the ESDP in military assessment and also a verification of procedures of the Berlin Plus.

The operation was ended on the 15\textsuperscript{th} of December 2003. As at this time Poland was not a member of the European Union, it was hard to require from our soldiers to be wholly involved in the mission. According to the above, Poland had sent 17 people to a conflict area\textsuperscript{15}.

Another continued operation was the one the European Union called “Althea”, lead in the Balkans, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A participation of third countries in this mission was regulated by art. 11 of the common actions of the Council of the European Union 2004/570/CFSP. It proclaimed that countries which are not members of the EU, but are members of NATO, can participate in military operations if they want to. What is more, countries that candidate to be members of the EU could be invited to be involved in operations, as well as potential partners and third countries\textsuperscript{16}. The operation was prepared with the close agreement of NATO and also realized in the formula Berlin Plus\textsuperscript{17}.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{15} Agreement between the European Union and republic of Poland on the participation of Polish armed forces in the European Union Force (EUF) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, OJ l. 34, 11/02/2003. See: NOLĪGUMS starp Eiropas Savienību un Polijas Republiku par Polijas bruņoto spēku līdzdalību Eiropas Savienibas bruņotajos spēkos (EUF) Bijušajā Dienvidslāvijas Republikā Maķedonijā.
\end{thebibliography}
In the years 2004–2007, about 6300 soldiers participated in the task, however later on – about 2300. The operation had been announced as a success of the European Union and particularly – national institutions had been rebuilt, national administration, police and judiciary had been strengthened, an efficiency of borders’ security had increased and also new regulations concerning a greater respect to humans’ rights have been introduced.

Armed forces of the Republic of Poland participated in the task. From the beginning the Polish Military Contingent had been functioning there, designed for operational actions under NATO (IFOR, SFOR), however from year 2004 – EUFOR Althea. The Polish Military Contingent consisted of a maneuvering company and has been subordinated to the Task Force North.

After 2007, some changes happened in the Contingent – the maneuvering company and the National Support Element had been transferred to a base in Camp Butmir near Sarajevo, where an infantry unit joined a multinational Maneuver Battalion. Despite that, two liaison observation teams have been appointed – their main purpose was to patrol the zone and help civilians who lived there.

In 2010 EUFOR finished its operation. In December the same year its tasks were taken over by the Polish Military Contingent PMC EUFOR/MTT\(^*\) that consists of four Mobile Training Teams and two Liaison Observation Teams. Moreover, Poles serve as a quarter of EUFOR forces and in the European Military Policy Branch\(^*\). At present, after coming back of a XII shift of the PMC, there are 50 soldiers left in Bosnia and Herzegovina\(^*\).

\(^*\) Decision of the President of the Republic of Poland from the 19.11.2010 on prolonging a period of using the Polish Military Contingent in the military operation of the European Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the Republic of Kosovo and the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia; decision of the Minister of National Defence No. 404 from the 4.11.2010; command of the Chief of the Polish General Staff No. 964/Oper/OCAF from the 8.11.2010, command of the Operational Commander of Armed Forces No. 51 from the 10.11.2010.


The next mission, in which the Polish Contingent participated, was the mission in Africa, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, appointed in 2005\textsuperscript{21}. A source of its emergence was the crisis in Darfur. Sudan’s government did not agree to a deployment of an independent mission of the European Union in this country, so according to that it has been deployed in eastern Chad and the Central African Republic. However, before the mission started, the European Union had been quite intensively criticized for negligence in preparations for the operation. It was all about a division of an organizational, financial and military exertion\textsuperscript{22}.

The mission had 3700 soldiers involved from 19 countries, including Poland. The Polish Military Contingent reached its operational capability in September 2008. Polish units were commanded by brigadier general Jean Philippe Ganascia. There were 400 soldiers in the mission and their main tasks were: controlling a region of their actions, leading patrols, monitoring and recognizing situations in the region, protecting convoys with humanitarian assistance, etc\textsuperscript{23}.

The Polish Contingent has been equipped with sixteen armored wheeled vehicles Rosomak, fifteen Land Rover cars, three helicopters, anti-aircraft twin-barreled autocannons ZU-32–2 and mortars 98mm\textsuperscript{24}.

The operation has been considered as a successful one. There has been good cooperation with the local society, potential dangers of the area in the territories of Chad and the Central African Republic have been identified and attacks on civilians have been prevented\textsuperscript{25}.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibidem, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibidem, p. 11.
Another mission of a military nature lead by the European Union was the operation “AMIS II IN DARFUR”\textsuperscript{26}. Tasks of the operation are: protection of food and humanitarian assistance distribution, protection of refugees coming back to their regular homes, disarming of Arabian constabulary units, prevention of encounters and revenge attacks. A particularly important element of the European Union being engaged in actions in Sudan was a case of using resources under the Fund for Peace in Africa\textsuperscript{27}.

A magnitude of problems arising there required the European Union making some constructive decisions. At the turn of 2003/2004 in Darfur, the government of Sudan and its forces conducted an operation of suppressing an anti-government uprising. The situation resulted in many negative repercussions and caused some tragic consequences. A few thousand people died and about 200 000 people emigrated to neighbouring states\textsuperscript{28}.

On the 8th of April 2004 an agreement about a discontinuation of fights between rebels and government were signed. \textit{Ipso facto} the European Union has been appointed as an organization that is supposed to be supervisor in the conflict area. A verification mission consisting of 150 observers had been prepared. On the 20th of October 2004 the Peace and Security Committee of the African Union decided to increase the credential of the mission. In consequence, a military mission of the European Union in Darfur was created – AMIS II.

The mission was supposed to involve 7700 people, including 881 policemen. A full operational capability had been established on a level of 12 000 people. A quarter of the mission had been located in Addis Ababa and operational structures – in Chad and Darfur itself\textsuperscript{29}. Tasks of the operation in Darfur involve:

- protection of food and humanitarian assistance distribution,

\textsuperscript{26} European Union civilian military supporting action to the Africa Union mission in the Darfur region of Sudan.


• protection of refugees coming back to their regular homes from before the conflict,
• disarming of Arabian constabulary units,
• the prevention of encounters and revenge acts\textsuperscript{30}.

The assistance of the European Union also embraces equipment for the African Union forces in a range of transport and aerial reconnaissance, logistic and planning support, military observers of an armistice, a mission for staff training and financial resources\textsuperscript{31}.

Poland made a decision to technically support the operation of the European Union in this region. Power generators, 300 chairs, 145 tables have been delivered to the African Union and what is more, 250 000 USD has been paid for the CERF. Resources from this fund have been directed to humanitarian assistance. In the meantime, a policeman has been delegated to perform the function of the High Advisor of the Head of Missions of Police in EL-FASHER\textsuperscript{32}.

Although personal participation in this operation was symbolic, Poland materially supported the mission as much as it could and had financial resources for that purpose. In the first military operation of a marine nature – ATALANTA, Poland did not participate\textsuperscript{33}. Similarly, Polish armed forces are not involved in the mission in Sudan\textsuperscript{34}.

Military missions contributed to the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Their quick extension of a geographic range

\textsuperscript{34} http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eu-somalia-training-mission?lang=en, entry date: 22.01.2013. At present, there are speculations about a Polish participation in a mission in Mali, however it is a training mission; http://www.wnp.pl/informacje/msz-w-ciagu-dwoch-tygodni-decyzja-ws-udzialu-w-misji-ue-w-mali,188298_1_0_0.html, entry date: 22.01.2013.
with Africa or Asia resulted in perceiving the Union as an international player. Therefore, the European Union’s missions have become an opportunity to build a multilateral dimension of a conflicts’ management system.

Thanks to them the European Union gained some experience in cooperation with NATO and with the UN. A standard of cooperation with the African Union has also been elaborated. It is worth emphasizing that a multilateralism of missions increases their credibility and a legitimization of the European Union on the international arena.

What is more, thanks to the participation of Poland in the Common Security and Defence Policy there is a process of taking over some European standards and their implementation at a national level. Mentioned processes are the exact Europeanization of Polish armed forces, which (even though they are based on NATO’s defense capabilities) engage in military missions lead by the European Union.

It causes a situation, when they undoubtedly take over and implement logistical, organizational or even partly military solutions to their internal national arrangements. Additionally, the participation of the Polish Military Contingent in every mission results in gaining some supplementary experience that is priceless, especially in cases of the participation in different kinds of operations.

Due to the fact that Poland (being the European state) participates in missions, operations or any initiatives organized under the Common Security and Defence Policy, it Europeanize its potential, actions’ rules and different resources as well. It is perceived through a prism of state actively engaged in defense politics lead under the European Union.

In my opinion, the Europeanization in a military assessment proceeds in some kind of a dichotomy. On the one hand, it concentrates on development of the European Union’s defense capabilities and on the other hand, it is associated with the problem of inefficiency of the Europeanization processes, because decisions about participation in the CSDP are made in an intergovernmental zone.

Unfortunately, this is a weakness of decision mechanisms of the CSDP. In spite of all, based on the experiences of the Polish armed forces’ participation in military missions one can assume that there have been some more or less incremental Europeanization processes. Most of all, the participation of Polish armed forces in military missions shows that we are the state that counts in Europe, the state that has the possibility and, first of all, adequate resources to be involved in these operations. They can be seen as both elements of bottom-up and top-down processes. They are also characterized with some isoform of certain solutions on a transnational level. However, missions lead by the European Union are criticized. The most mentioned accusations in a doctrine and political analysis are:

- temporality of missions – usually short,
- missions numbers.

States taking part in missions are accused of displaying a flag, so treating an operation as an opportunity to promote the European Union on the international arena or to promote one’s own country. Moreover, a logistic side of missions is very often criticized as well, especially quantitative and qualitative deficiencies. It is emphasized that if missions lead by the European Union are supposed to be successful, a decision making process of states that want to participate in this kind of operations needs to be accelerated, a level of military training has to be advanced and also an army must be equipped with the appropriate utensils ensuring interoperability.

Military missions lead by the European Union do not have a long-term and at the same time strategic planning, that results in them being short and also casual. In this context, there should also be introduced some modifications that could eliminate existing problems in planning and bring back a constant capability of the Union to plan and coordinate such operations.

In this context the question arises – will the European Union be capable of implementing such recommendations? Of course, there are many more problems than that and a quite important one is the case of financing the operation.

A present system makes countries participating in operations unequally financially burdened, that causes a situation where some states express their disapprobation concerning the participation in the CSDP or a reluc-
tance to the participation in military or even civilian missions. However, despite these weaknesses it seems that states participating in the CSDP and also taking part in military missions subject to processes of the widely understood Europeanization.

In this context, the Polish army had to adjust its technical, organizational and human potential to changing conditionings. The Europeanization of the safety policy lead in Poland had a downloading assessment. It was based on transferring Union’s preferences to the level of a member state. Accepted standards, rules of actions and also commanding mechanisms resulted in Polish armed forces being subjected to a systematic process of the Europeanization. It was not the Europeanization based on transferring Polish standards to a transnational level, but the other way round.

The participation in a variety of peacekeeping and civilian missions was supposed to indicate that our national preferences are prone to receive directives from a transnational system. What is more, a fact of the participation of Polish armed forces in the Union’s missions was an element of some solidarity towards certain states of the European Union.

Of course, this solidarity was differently perceived by certain member states; some of them assumed that the Polish actions are too pro-European, but in general representatives of the EU institutions claimed that our country should adjust and adapt our own policy from a safety field to Union’s standards. There were a lot of opponents of this approach, especially in the situation, when there was a discrepancy between the interests of NATO and ESDP. Moreover, certain political forces’ exercising authorities in Poland had quite a different attitude towards the Union’s safety policy.

Some governments called Europists, for example France, claim that we should actively participate in it and other ones, called Atlanticists, for example Great Britain, Holland, Denmark, Portugal had a little bit less enthusiasm for the concept Italy claimed that a priority is most of all a participation in operations lead under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty36.

36 C.T. Szyjko, Doskonalenie systemu bezpieczeństwa państwa, “Studia Prawnicze Ius et Praxis” 03 [04]/07; Bezpieczeństwo współczesnego świata w teorii i praktyce, Warsaw 2007, p.76–82.
Despite these discrepancies, there is still the fact of Poland participating in selected operations lead by the European Union and of the Europeanization of the national policy. By the adaptation to the ESDP one can understand a change of a national policy, as well as behaviors, beliefs and main political actors, which results in a convergence of the national policy with the foreign policy of the European Union.

This adaptation also means a change of positions and creating a new position in some case that has never been considered before, especially because of participation in the ESDP\textsuperscript{37}.

**SUMMARY**

The participation of Poland in the Union’s military missions was dictated by a conviction about the need of a common, solidary cooperation in solving problems on a local, as well as international level, especially in the situation, when local issues could transform into a problem of a wider, so regional or global nature.

Ensuring a state’s safety and strengthening of the position of Poland on the international arena, as constant purposes of our national policy, required joining in any international initiatives that were supposed to serve as a realization of strategic national aims.

Due to the fact that different processes and phenomena happening in surroundings, regions and in the world influenced by the Polish safety, Poland had to actively participate in these actions.

The active membership of Poland in foreign missions had been creating conditions that favor economical development and a progress of civilization. The participation in missions lead under the aegis of the European Union was also a realization of allied commitments and they were the one to constitute the credibility of Poland.

The participation of Poland in the Common Security and Defence Policy can be divided into two periods. The first once embraces a time, when Poland was not a member of the European Union and, to be honest, its participation in a decisive process under the CSDP had more of a personal nature of engagement into lead missions. Therefore, Poland activated its military forces in military operations, as well as civilian ones, of which there were more.

A second period is the time after 2004, when Poland had become a member of the European Union. In this case, we had a formal right to participate or make decisions ands not to participate in certain initiatives of the European Union. In operations that

\textsuperscript{37} M.E. Smith, *Conforming to Europe; the domestic impact UE policy cooperation*, “Journal of the European Public Policy” 2000, Vol. 7. No. 4, p. 617.
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had national forces involved, it is possible to notice happening there processes of the Europeanization.

Generally, they were based on taking over soft regulation aspects elaborated on a Union’s level and implementing them in actions of Polish organizations. Even though under the CSDP decisions were made and are made in an intergovernmental way, in situations when Poland participated in operations lead by the European Union, it has always adjusted to the dictate of Brussels. It resulted from an operational, organizational and logistic subordination of the Polish Military Contingent.

To sum up, it can be assumed that even in a policy considered as a field with many flaws\(^\text{38}\), there still are ongoing processes of Europeanization based on taking over elements of soft laws and in some cases – hard regulations as well. In this context, Polish armed forces received some “best practices”, learnt to act in completely different conditions and fields that made their adjustments and taking over good practices have some kind of a socialization nature.

**Keywords:** Europeanization, policy safety, European Union

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\(^{38}\) CFSP and CSDP.